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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Nathalie I. Davaut, Employee, Claimant, Petitioner, 
v. 
University of South Carolina and State Accident Fund,  
Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001218 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from the South Carolina Workers' Compensation 

Commission 

Opinion No. 27673 

Heard May 18, 2016 – Filed October 26, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Paul L. Reeves, of Reeves Law Firm, L.L.C., of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Paul L. Hendrix, of Jones & Hendrix, P.A., of 
Spartanburg, for Respondents. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Petitioner Nathalie I. Davaut appeals the denial of her 
claim for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained attempting to 
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leave her workplace.  We now reverse the court of appeals, which upheld the 
Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of those benefits.  Davaut v. Univ. of 
S.C., Op. No. 2015-UP-041 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 21, 2015).  As discussed 
below, we reject the suggestion that this case is controlled by the "going and 
coming" rule, which generally precludes workers' compensation benefits for 
injuries sustained while an employee is traveling to and from work.  We adopt the 
so-called "divided premises" rule and hold that when an employee travels from one 
portion of her employer's property to another over a reasonably necessary and 
direct route, the employee remains in the course of her employment for purposes of 
workers' compensation.  We thus remand this case to the Workers' Compensation 
Commission for a determination of benefits.
I. 
Petitioner, a French and Spanish professor at the University of South Carolina 
Lancaster (USCL), was injured walking to her car after work on February 16, 
2012. Petitioner had been reviewing résumés in the library on behalf of a search 
committee looking to hire a new Spanish professor.  She left the library, where the 
résumés were on reserve, when it closed at 9 p.m.  To reach her car, which was in a 
university lot provided for faculty and student parking,1 Petitioner was required to 
cross Hubbard Drive (the Street), which bisects USCL's campus. While crossing 
the Street, Petitioner was struck by a vehicle and injured.  It is undisputed that the 
Street and the crosswalks that span it are not owned or controlled by Petitioner's 
employer, the University of South Carolina (USC);2 rather, they are maintained 
and controlled by the City of Lancaster.  However, it is also undisputed that both 
1 According to the record, faculty members are free to park anywhere on USCL's
campus, which, other than designated handicap parking, has only two categories of 
parking spaces: faculty and unmarked.  Although faculty members are allowed to 
park in the faculty-designated spaces, they are not required to do so. Indeed, 
because of the limited number of faculty-designated spaces, faculty members are 
often unable to park in those spots. 
2 USCL is a regional campus within the USC system.  Recognizing this 
relationship, and for the sake of consistency with the case caption, we refer to 
Petitioner's employer as USC.  When describing the physical campus where 
Petitioner worked, however, we continue to refer to USCL. 
14 

  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
the library—where Petitioner had been working—and the parking lot—where 
Petitioner was headed—belong to USC. 
Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits from her employer and its 
insurer, State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents).  Respondents, relying on 
the going and coming rule, denied Petitioner's injuries were compensable, on the 
basis Petitioner was injured away from USC's property. 
Petitioner appeared before a single commissioner (the Commissioner), who found 
Petitioner's injuries were not compensable.  In so finding, the Commissioner relied 
upon this Court's opinion in Howell v. Pacific Columbia Mills, 291 S.C. 469, 354 
S.E.2d 384 (1987), which the Commissioner found to be controlling.  In Howell, 
we held that a millworker did not suffer a compensable injury when she was struck 
by a car while crossing a public street via a crosswalk that connected an employer-
maintained parking lot with one of the mill's main entrances.  Id. at 471–74, 354 
S.E.2d at 385–86. Because Petitioner's injuries also occurred on a public street 
over which her employer exercised no control, the Commissioner concluded those
injuries were not compensable.   
Upon review by an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission 
(the Panel), Petitioner argued that the Commissioner erred in relying upon Howell
because the employee in Howell never reached the employer's premises before 
being injured. Petitioner claimed her injuries arose under distinguishable 
circumstances—she had already reached her employer's property; moreover, she 
had not yet left her employer's property because the Street, although not owned by 
USC, is "so close in proximity and so close in relation so as to be in practical effect 
a part of [USC's] premises."  The Panel acknowledged that Howell was factually 
distinguishable, but nevertheless rejected Petitioner's argument and upheld the 
Commissioner's ruling denying Petitioner's claim.
After the Panel rejected Petitioner's arguments, she appealed to the court of 
appeals. Petitioner claimed that because she was injured while traveling from one 
portion of USC's property to another, the Panel erred in denying her relief.  The 
court of appeals disagreed and upheld the Panel's denial of coverage.  Davaut, Op. 
No. 2015-UP-041. The court of appeals concluded that "substantial evidence" 
supported the Panel's determination that Petitioner's injuries "did not arise out of 
and in the course of her employment," in part because there were no faculty-
designated spaces in the lot where Petitioner parked her car.  Id.
15 

  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Petitioner asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals and find that she suffered 
a compensable injury when she was struck by a vehicle while crossing a public 
street running through USCL's campus.   
II. 
Petitioner argues the Commissioner, the Panel, and the court of appeals erred in 
accepting Respondents' contention that the going and coming rule controls this 
case. Consequently, Petitioner claims the Commissioner, the Panel, and the court 
of appeals erred in relying upon the going and coming rule to find that an 
employee injured traveling between two portions of her employer's premises while 
attempting to leave work does not suffer a compensable injury. We agree. 
A. 
"Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), . . . .  '[t]his Court will not 
overturn a decision by the [Workers' Compensation] Commission unless the 
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence.'"  Pollack v. S. Wine & 
Spirits of Am., 405 S.C. 9, 13–14, 747 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2013) (quoting Jones v. 
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 355 S.C. 413, 416, 586 S.E.2d 111, 113 (2003)) (citing S.C. Code 
Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2015)).  However, the Court "may reverse when the 
decision is affected by an error of law."  Id. (citing S.C. Code Ann § 1-23-380(5)).
Because the facts are not in dispute, we are free to decide this case as a matter of 
law. See Grant v. Grant Textiles, 372 S.C. 196, 201, 641 S.E.2d 869, 872 (2007) 
("Where there are no disputed facts, the question of whether an accident is 
compensable is a question of law." (citing Douglas v. Spartan Mills, 245 S.C. 265, 
266, 140 S.E.2d 173, 173 (1965))). Therefore, we are not constrained by the 
"substantial evidence" standard of review that the court of appeals found limited its 
examination of this case.  See Pollack, 405 S.C. at 13–14, 747 S.E.2d at 432 
(citations omitted). 
B. 
"Workers' compensation pays an employee benefits for damages resulting from
personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employment."  Bentley v. Spartanburg County, 398 S.C. 418, 422, 730 S.E.2d 296, 
16 

   
   
 
  
 
 
 
298 (2012) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-310 (2015)).  "'Arising out of' refers to 
the origin of the cause of the accident; 'in the course of' refers to the time, place, 
and circumstances under which the accident occurred."  Baggott v. S. Music, Inc., 
330 S.C. 1, 5, 496 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (citing Owings v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff's 
Dep't, 315 S.C. 297, 299, 433 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1993); Eargle v. S.C. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 205 S.C. 423, 429, 32 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1944)).  "An injury occurs in the 
course of employment 'when it occurs within the period of employment at a place 
where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while 
fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental thereto.'" Id. (quoting 
Beam v. State Workmen's Comp. Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 331, 200 S.E.2d 83, 85 
(1973)). "In determining whether a work-related injury is compensable, the 
Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed toward providing coverage and 
any reasonable doubt as to the construction of the Act will be resolved in favor of 
coverage." Whigham v. Jackson Dawson Commc'ns, 410 S.C. 131, 135, 763 
S.E.2d 420, 422 (2014) (citing Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 455–56, 535 
S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000)).
Consistent with this rule of construction, we have recognized that  
employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a 
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing 
to and from the place where the work is to be done.  If the employee 
be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the 
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, 
or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in 
practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one 
arising out of and in the course of the employment . . . . 
Williams v. S.C. State Hosp., 245 S.C. 377, 381, 140 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1965) 
(quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, "[t]he act of leaving the employer's premises is 'in 
the course of' one's employment if the employee leaves the premises as 
contemplated at the close of the work day." Camp v. Spartan Mills, 302 S.C. 348, 
350, 396 S.E.2d 121, 122 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Williams, 245 S.C. at 381–82, 
140 S.E.2d at 603). Compare Williams, 245 S.C. at 382, 140 S.E.2d at 603 
(affirming an award of benefits to an employee injured walking from the hospital 
building where she worked to an employer-maintained parking lot provided for 
employee parking and describing the employee walking to the parking lot at the 
17 

  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
end of her workday as "a reasonable incident to [the employee] leaving the place of 
her work"), with Camp, 302 S.C. at 350, 396 S.E.2d at 122 (holding the Workers'
Compensation Commission properly concluded an employee's "delay of four hours 
exceeded a reasonable margin of time for leaving her work place" and therefore the 
employee "was no longer in the course of her employment when she [was injured]"
attempting to leave her employer's premises).  
Nonetheless, this Court has long held that "an employee going to or coming from
the place where his work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any 
service growing out of and incidental to his employment."  Sola v. Sunny Slope 
Farms, 244 S.C. 6, 14, 135 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1964).  Therefore, "[t]he general rule 
in South Carolina is that an injury sustained by an employee away from the 
employer's premises while on his way to or from work does not arise out of and in 
the course of employment."  Howell, 291 S.C. at 471, 354 S.E.2d at 385 (citing 
Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 263, 22 S.E.2d 715, 717–18 (1942)).  This 
is the well-known going and coming rule.  See, e.g., Medlin v. Upstate Plaster 
Serv., 329 S.C. 92, 95–96, 495 S.E.2d 447, 449–50 (1998) (citations omitted) 
(discussing the rule but holding it did not preclude workers' compensation benefits
under the facts of that case). However, there are several recognized exceptions to 
the going and coming rule, including where although an employee's injuries are 
incurred away from the employer's premises, "the place of injury was brought 
within the scope of employment by an express or implied requirement in the 
contract of employment of its use by the [employee] in going to and coming from
his work." Sola, 244 S.C. at 14, 135 S.E.2d at 326 (citations omitted).  We refer to 
this as "the fourth Sola exception." See Howell, 291 S.C. at 472 n.1, 354 S.E.2d at 
385 n.1 (noting that "[t]his is the fourth exception to the going and coming rule" 
listed in Sola).
III. 
Respondents contend that Petitioner seeks relief under the fourth Sola exception, 
which was also at issue in Howell, and therefore our decision in that case is 
dispositive.  Petitioner, however, argues her claim depends upon the framework set 
forth in Williams and a legal theory not addressed in Howell, namely, the divided 
premises rule.  We agree with Petitioner and conclude that the Commissioner, the 
Panel, and the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in relying on Howell's
application of the going and coming rule to resolve this case. 
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A. 
In Howell, we concluded the going and coming rule supported the Workers'
Compensation Commission's determination that an employee's injuries "did not 
arise out of and in the course of [her] employment."  Howell, 291 S.C. at 470, 354 
S.E.2d at 385. The employee in Howell was a millworker injured in a crosswalk 
that connected the mill with employer-maintained parking facilities.  Id. at 471, 
354 S.E.2d at 385. However, the employee was not traveling from the employer-
maintained parking facilities to the mill when she was injured; rather, she had been 
dropped off by her husband and exited the car directly onto the public street, where 
she was then struck by a vehicle. Id., see also id. at 474, 354 S.E.2d at 386 (noting 
that the employee "was hit after she got out of her husband's car on a public street 
while on her way to work"). The employee was therefore injured going to work, 
and because she "failed to establish an implied requirement in her contract of 
employment that she cross the street in the crosswalk where the accident occurred," 
we rejected her contention that the fourth Sola exception brought her injuries 
within the course of her employment.  Id. at 472, 354 S.E.2d at 385–86. We then 
expressly declined to consider the divided premises rule, which "relates to an 
employee going between an employer-maintained parking area and the employer's 
place of business," because the employee "had never even entered the parking area 
that was maintained by the employer" before she was injured.  Id. at 474, 354 
S.E.2d at 386. 
Whereas the employee in Howell was injured before ever reaching her employer's 
premises, and thus could only have prevailed by satisfying an exception to the 
going and coming rule, here Petitioner had already reached her employer's 
premises and was injured while traveling from one portion of the premises to 
another. Thus, this case provides the Court an opportunity to address the question 
left unanswered in Howell: Is an employee's injury compensable when the 
employee is injured traveling between the employer's business and an employer-
maintained parking lot located across a public thoroughfare?   
Petitioner urges us to answer the above question in favor of compensability.  We 
agree employees injured in such circumstances are entitled to workers'
compensation benefits; we therefore use this occasion to join the majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted the divided premises rule.  See Epler v. N. Am. 
Rockwell Corp., 393 A.2d 1163, 1167 & n.2 (Pa. 1978) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) 
(collecting cases and discussing the majority rule regarding employee travel along 
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"a necessary route between two portions of the [employer's] premises"); 2 Lex K. 
Larson & Thomas A. Robinson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
§ 13.01[4][a] (2016) (stating that "compensation is almost always awarded" to 
employees injured "travel[ing] along or across a public road between two portions 
of the employer's premises"); id. § 13.01[4][b] (noting that "most courts . . . hold 
that an injury in a public street or other off-premises place between the plant and 
the [employer-owned or -maintained] parking lot is in the course of employment, 
being on a necessary route between the two portions of the premises").  Because 
this case implicates the divided premises rule in the context of an employer-
maintained parking lot,3 we specifically hold that "employees who must cross a 
public way that bisects an employer's premises[,] and who are injured on that 
public way while traveling a direct route between an employer's . . . facility and 
parking lot, are entitled to workers' compensation benefits."  Copeland v. Leaf, 
Inc., 829 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. 1992). 
3 In fact, some courts refer to this principle as the "parking lot exception" to the 
going and coming rule.  See, e.g., Harrison v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 
142, 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the exception "provides that an employee 
remains within the course of employment when traveling from the place of work to 
an employer-owned or -controlled parking lot, even if the course of travel 
necessitates that the employee traverse a public road").  However, we do not view 
today's holding as creating another exception to the going and coming rule, which 
continues to preclude recovery for injuries incurred before an employee reaches
and after an employee leaves her employer's premises.  For purposes of workers' 
compensation, however, an employee crossing over a public street while going 
between two portions of her employer's premises has already reached and not yet 
left those premises; thus, the going and coming rule is inapplicable in the first 
instance. See, e.g., Epler, 393 A.2d at 1165–67 (concluding a public road 
separating the employer's plant from a parking lot provided for employee parking 
was part of the employer's premises under the state's workers' compensation law 
(citations omitted)); cf. Evans v. Coats & Clark, 328 S.C. 467, 469, 492 S.E.2d 
807, 808 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding "a common area situated in the lobby of the 
building that housed [the employee's] place of employment" was part of the 
employer's premises and therefore the going and coming rule did not preclude the 
employee's recovery of workers' compensation benefits (citations omitted)).
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B. 

Applying the standard expressed above to the undisputed facts of this case, it 
necessarily follows that Petitioner's injuries are compensable: Petitioner was 
injured attempting to leave her employer's premises by traveling a direct route 
from the library, where she had been reviewing résumés on behalf of her employer, 
to her car, which was located in an on-campus parking lot provided for employee 
and student parking. Cf. Williams, 245 S.C. at 382, 140 S.E.2d at 603 (affirming 
an award of benefits to an employee injured while "proceeding by the most direct 
route from the building where she worked to the employer[-]maintained parking 
area"). 
In short, because Petitioner was injured traveling between two portions of her 
employer's premises—the library and the parking lot—as anticipated at the end of 
her work day, her injuries are compensable, notwithstanding the fact she was
injured while she was not physically on USC's property.  Indeed, "[w]e find no 
justification in logic or law which would support the conclusion that compensation 
should be denied, under the facts of the instant case, solely because the accident 
occurred while the claimant was crossing a public road."  Epler, 393 A.2d at 1166; 
accord Copeland, 829 S.W.2d at 144 ("To allow coverage from the plant to the 
public street, to disallow coverage while crossing the street, and to allow coverage 
while walking in the parking lot to her automobile would appear inconsistent and 
illogical."); cf. Williams, 245 S.C. at 381, 140 S.E.2d at 603 ("The fact that the 
accident occurred shortly after the claimant had left her immediate place of work is 
not conclusive. A reasonable length of time must be given an employee to separate 
himself or herself from the place of work.  The employment contemplated her 
entry upon and departure from the place of work as much as it contemplated her 
working there, and must include a reasonable interval of time for that purpose.");
Evans v. Coats & Clark, 328 S.C. 467, 468–69, 492 S.E.2d 807, 807–08 (Ct. App.
1997) (finding an employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits where 
she was injured in the lobby of the building where her employer was located even 
though the lobby was a common area not owned or controlled by the employer, 
reasoning that the lobby was effectively part of the employer's premises because it 
was an area over which the employer had a right of passage and it was along a 
route commonly used by employees to access and exit the work premises (citations 
omitted)).   
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Application of the divided premises rule is especially warranted where, as in the 
instant case, the employer creates the need for the employee to cross the public 
street. See Epler, 393 A.2d at 1168 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (stating that a public 
road dividing the employer's property was properly considered part of the 
employer's premises because "the employer [wa]s responsible for creating the 
necessity of his employees' encountering the particular hazards of the trip between 
a non-contiguous parking lot and the working plant itself"); accord Copeland, 829 
S.W.2d at 144 (noting "it was the employer who created the necessity of the 
employee's crossing a public street").  Moreover, it is of no moment that USC did 
not require Petitioner to use the parking lot across the Street from her worksite; 
what is relevant is that USC allowed her to and, once she did, the necessity of 
crossing the Street arose.  Cf. Longuepee v. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 605 S.E.2d 455, 457 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the employee's exercise of discretion in how she 
traveled from the employer-owned parking lot to her worksite did not remove her 
from the course of her employment where the employee took "a reasonably direct 
route to work from the parking facility").  Simply put, USC cannot avail itself of 
the benefits that come from providing its employees a place to park and then 
disclaim responsibility for the consequences of that decision. Cf. Knight-Ridder 
Newspaper Sales, Inc. v. Desselle, 335 S.E.2d 458, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) ("The 
parking lot was provided by the employer for the convenience of the employer and 
of the employees, who were encouraged to use the lot.  It is immaterial that the 
[employee] was not required to park in the lot.  He did so on this occasion.").         
We acknowledge, but ultimately reject, Respondents' argument that adoption of the 
divided premises rule will prove unworkable.  Respondents presume that under this 
rule, so long as an employee is traveling between two portions of an employer's 
premises, injuries incurred during the journey will be compensable regardless of 
the reason for the travel or the route taken by the employee.  Respondents' fear is 
misplaced, for nothing in today's opinion removes the requirement that for an 
employee's injuries to be compensable, the employee must be injured "in the 
performance of his [employment] duties and while fulfilling those duties or 
engaged in something incidental thereto." Baggott, 330 S.C. at 5, 496 S.E.2d at 
854 (quoting Beam, 261 S.C. at 331, 200 S.E.2d at 85) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Our holding today merely recognizes that an employee traveling along a 
reasonably necessary and direct route between two portions of the employer's 
premises is engaged in something incidental to the employment. Cf. Williams, 245 
S.C. at 382, 140 S.E.2d at 603 ("The act of claimant in walking from the building 
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where she worked to the parking area was just as much a reasonable incident to her 
leaving the place of her work as walking from the ward where she worked along a 
hallway to the door of the building.").  Today's ruling also gives effect to the 
Court's broad construction of course of employment in Williams—if an employee 
who must cross a public street to travel from her worksite to an employer-
maintained parking lot is not "passing, with the express or implied consent of the 
employer, . . . over [the premises] of another in such proximity and relation as to 
be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises," id. at 381, 140 S.E.2d at 
603 (citation omitted), we do not know who is.  Cf. Evans, 328 S.C.at 469, 492 
S.E.2d at 808 (holding that common areas of the building where the employer is 
located may be considered parts of the employer's premises (citations omitted)).        
Of course, determining whether an injury occurs in the course of employment 
remains an inherently fact-specific inquiry.  See, e.g., Pierre v. Seaside Farms, 
Inc., 386 S.C. 534, 541, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010) (noting that "each case must 
be decided with reference to its own attendant circumstances" (quoting Hall v. 
Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 349, 656 S.E.2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Our workers' compensation commissioners 
regularly determine whether the facts of a particular case give rise to a 
compensable injury, and we do not doubt they will be equally capable of applying 
the rule adopted in this case to deny meritless claims.  See, e.g., Pratt v. Morris 
Roofing, Inc., 357 S.C. 619, 622, 594 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2004) ("The question of 
whether an accident arises out of and is in the course and scope of employment is 
largely a question of fact for the full [Workers' Compensation C]ommission." 
(citing Wright v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 314 S.C. 152, 155, 442 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ct. App. 
1994))); cf. Armstrong v. Food Lion, Inc., 371 S.C. 271, 276, 639 S.E.2d 50, 52–53 
(2006) (stating that to recover from a tortfeasor's employer under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, a plaintiff must show the tortfeasor was acting in the scope of 
his employment by furthering his employer's business, otherwise employers are not 
vicariously liable for the actions of their employees (citing Lane v. Modern Music, 
Inc., 244 S.C. 299, 304–05, 136 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1964))); Adams v. S.C. Power 
Co., 200 S.C. 438, 441, 21 S.E.2d 17, 18–19 (1942) (recognizing that for purposes 
of respondeat superior, whether an employee was acting in the course of his 
employment is usually a question of fact for the jury (citations omitted)). 
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IV. 

 
We reverse the court of appeals and hold that when an employee crosses from one 
portion of her employer's property to another over a reasonably necessary and 
direct route, the employee remains in the course of her employment for purposes of 
workers' compensation.     
 
This case is hereby remanded to the Workers' Compensation Commission for a 
determination of benefits. 
 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.     
 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. 
Moore, concur. 
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Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Oconee County.  Effective November 1, 
2016, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Oconee County 
must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of case or 
the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently 
designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon  Lee  Greenville 
Sumter  Williamsburg  Pickens 
Spartanburg   Cherokee Anderson 
Oconee—Effective November 1, 2016 
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the 
training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether 
any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to 
review, and to instruct their staff to review, the training materials available on the E-
Filing Portal. 
 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER
25 

  Columbia, South Carolina
October 20, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Amendments to the South Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the South Carolina Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement   
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002336 
ORDER 
The Commission on Lawyer Conduct and the Commission and Judicial Conduct 
have proposed a number of amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
contained in Rule 407, SCACR; the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
contained in Rule 413, SCACR; and the Rules for Judicial Disciplinary 
Enforcement contained in Rule 502, SCACR.  The proposed changes would: (1) 
add specific language from decisions of this Court related to the assertion of 
retaining liens by attorneys; (2) require that lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions 
self-report discipline imposed by another jurisdiction, and amend the definition of 
the term "lawyer" within the Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) adopt a rule 
providing for the mandatory random audits of lawyer trust accounts; and (4) 
provide for the hiring of a presiding disciplinary judge to act as a hearing officer to 
preside over disciplinary and incapacity hearings.    
After careful consideration of the Commissions' proposed amendments, we decline 
to adopt the proposed changes requiring random audits of lawyer trust accounts 
and the hiring of a presiding disciplinary judge.  We agree to adopt modified 
versions of the Commissions' other proposed amendments, but decline to adopt the 
definition of a lawyer proposed by the Commissions.     
Accordingly, we amend Rules 1.16, 5.1, and 8.3, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR; and 
Rule 29, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, as set forth in the attachment to this Order.  
These amendments are effectively immediately.     
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 s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 25, 2016 
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 Comment 9 to Rule 1.16, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
 
Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal 
 
[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must 
take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer 
may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See 
Rule 1.15; In re Tillman, 319 S.C. 461, 432 S.E.2d 283 (1995); In re Anonymous 
Member of South Carolina Bar, 287 S.C. 250, 335 S.E.2d 803 (1985). When 
permitted, a nonrefundable retainer still must comply with Rule 1.5 and not be 
unreasonable. 
 
Comment 9 to Rule 5.1, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
 
[9] Paragraph (d) expresses a principle of responsibility to the clients of the law 
firm. Where partners or lawyers with comparable authority reasonably believe a 
lawyer is suffering from a significant cognitive impairment, they have a duty to 
protect the interests of clients and ensure that the representation does not harm 
clients or result in a violation of these rules. See Rule 1.16(a). One mechanism for 
addressing concerns before matters must be taken to the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct is found in Rule 428, SCACR. See also Rule 8.3(c) regarding the 
obligation to report a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct when there is 
knowledge a violation has been committed as opposed to a belief that the lawyer 
may be suffering from an impairment of the lawyer's cognitive function. 
 
Rule 8.3, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
 
RULE 8.3: REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT 
 
(a) A lawyer who is arrested for or has been charged by way of indictment, 
information or complaint with a serious crime shall inform the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct in writing within fifteen days of being arrested or being charged 
by way of indictment, information or complaint. 
 
(b) A lawyer who is disciplined or transferred to incapacity inactive status in 
another jurisdiction shall inform the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in writing 
within fifteen days of discipline or transfer.   
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 (c) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority. 
 
(d) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules 
of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness for office in other respects shall inform the appropriate 
authority. 
 
(e) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6. 
 
(f) Inquiries or information received by the South Carolina Bar Lawyers Helping 
Lawyers Committee or an equivalent county bar association committee regarding 
the need for treatment for alcohol, drug abuse or depression, or by the South 
Carolina Bar law office management assistance program or an equivalent county 
bar association program regarding a lawyer seeking the program assistance, shall 
not be disclosed to the disciplinary authority without written permission of the 
lawyer receiving assistance. Any such inquiry or information shall enjoy the same 
confidence as information protected by the attorney-client privilege under 
applicable law. 
 
Comment 
 
[1] Self regulation of the legal profession requires, under some circumstances, that 
members of the profession report themselves to disciplinary authorities in order to 
protect the interests of the profession, the public, and the judicial process. 
Paragraphs (a) and (b) set forth the limited circumstances under which a lawyer is 
required to self-report. Any lawyer admitted to practice in South Carolina has a 
duty to self-report under paragraphs (a) and (b). The disciplinary procedures for 
handling matters giving rise to mandatory self-reports are set forth in Rules 17 and 
29, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
 
[2] Self regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession 
initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by another lawyer. Lawyers have a similar obligation with 
respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a 
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pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting 
a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the 
offense. The South Carolina version of paragraph (d) modifies the model version 
by specifically including "honesty" and "trustworthiness" to parallel the 
requirement of paragraph (c). 
[3] A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of 
Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure 
where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests. 
[4] If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to 
report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement 
existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the 
reporting obligation to those offenses that a self regulating profession must 
vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in 
complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial" refers to the 
seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the 
lawyer is aware. A report should be made to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the 
circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial 
misconduct. 
[5] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained 
to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is 
governed by the Rules applicable to the client lawyer relationship.
[6] Paragraph (f) encourages lawyers to seek assistance from the South Carolina 
Bar Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee, from a South Carolina Bar law office 
management assistance program, or from an equivalent county bar association 
program without fear of being reported for violating the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be 
received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved 
lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an 
exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Rule 
encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program. 
Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek 
assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their 
professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public. 
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These Rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of information received 
by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers assistance program; such 
an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of the program or other law. 
Rule 29(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
(a) Lawyers Disciplined or Transferred to Incapacity Inactive Status in 
Another Jurisdiction. Within fifteen days of being disciplined or transferred to 
incapacity inactive status in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in 
this state shall inform the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in writing of the 
discipline or transfer. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission has been disciplined or transferred to incapacity 
inactive status in another jurisdiction, disciplinary counsel shall obtain a certified 
copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Commission and the Supreme 
Court. 
32 

  
 
 
 
 
  
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Re: Amendments to the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules and the South Carolina Court-Annexed Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Rules 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001365 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 422, SCACR, 
Rule 2(h), ADR Rules, and Rule 19, ADR Rules are amended as set forth in the 
attachment to this Order.  These rule amendments, which were proposed by the 
Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR Commission), alter the 
composition of the ADR Commission and the qualifications of persons who may 
be certified as family court mediators.  
 
These amendments are effective immediately.   
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 26, 2016 
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 Rule 422(b), South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, is amended to provide: 
 
(b) Membership of Commission. The Commission's Chair will be the Chief 
Justice or the Chief Justice's designee. The Supreme Court will appoint the 
Commission's other members as follows: 
 
(1) State Judges: One Circuit Court judge, one Family Court judge; one 
judge from the state appellate bench; one summary court judge; two judges 
from any state court. 
 
(2) Practicing Lawyers: Six practicing lawyers, at least four of whom are 
certified arbitrators and/or mediators, with due regard for diversity of 
practices among the members. 
 
(3) Two public members who may be certified arbitrators or mediators. 
 
(4) A county clerk of court. 
 
(5) The Director of Court Administration or the Director's designee. 
 
(6) The Chair of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee or the 
Chair's designee. 
 
(7) The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee or the Chair's designee. 
 
(8) The Chair of the South Carolina Bar's Dispute Resolution Section or the 
Chair's designee. 
 
(9) An at-large member who may be a certified mediator or arbitrator. 
 
Rule 2(h), South Carolina Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Rules, is amended to provide: 
(h) Certified. A mediator or arbitrator who is approved by the Board of Arbitrator 
and Mediator Certification to be eligible for court appointment pursuant to these 
rules. A certified mediator or arbitrator may refer to himself or herself as a  
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 "Supreme Court of South Carolina Certified Mediator" or a "Supreme Court of 
South Carolina Certified Arbitrator." 
Rule 19, South Carolina Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 
is amended to provide: 
Rule 19 
Certification of Court-Appointed Neutrals 
(a) Applications. The Board of Arbitrator and Mediator Certification ("Board") 
shall receive and approve applications for certifications of persons to be appointed 
as mediators or arbitrators. The application shall be on a form approved by the 
Supreme Court or the Board. Recertification of a neutral who, by virtue of current 
job restrictions is prohibited from serving under these rules, is allowed if the 
neutral submits the appropriate recertification paperwork, pays the applicable fee 
and agrees upon termination of the prohibiting employment to promptly 
supplement the application to list at least one county for court appointments.  
(b) Certification. For circuit court or family court certification, a person must: 
(1) Either: 
(A) Be admitted to practice law in this State for at least three (3) years 
and be a member in good standing of the South Carolina Bar, 
including retired or inactive lawyers. This includes members who may 
be on retired or inactive status and any person who holds a limited 
license; or 
(B) Be admitted to practice law in the highest court of another state or 
the District of Columbia for at least three (3) years and: 
(i) Be at least 21 years old; 
(ii) Have received a juris doctorate degree or its equivalent from 
a law school approved by the American Bar Association; 
(iii) Be a member in good standing in each jurisdiction where 
he or she is admitted to practice law. This includes persons who 
may be retired or inactive; and 
35 

  
 
(iv) Agree to be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 407, SCACR, and the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR, to the same extent as a regular 
member of the South Carolina Bar. 
(2) Be of good moral character; 
(3) Have not, within the last five (5) years, been: 
(A) Disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; 
(B) Denied admission to a bar for character or ethical reasons; or 
(C) Publicly reprimanded or publicly disciplined for professional 
conduct; 
(4) Pay all administrative fees and comply with all procedures established by 
the Supreme Court, the Board and the Commission on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution; and 
(5) Agree to provide mediation/arbitration to indigents without pay. 
(6) To be certified as a Circuit Court Mediator, a person must also: 
(A) Have completed a minimum of forty (40) hours in a civil 
mediation training program approved by the Board, or any other 
training program attended prior to the promulgation of these rules or 
attended in other states and approved by the Board; and  
(B) Demonstrate familiarity with the statutes, rules and practice 
governing mediation settlement conferences in South Carolina. 
(7) To be certified as a Family Court Mediator, a person must also: 
(A) Have completed a minimum of forty (40) hours in a family court 
mediation training program approved by the Board, or any other 
training program attended prior to the promulgation of these rules or 
attended in other states and approved by the Board; 
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(B) Demonstrate familiarity with the statutes, rules and practice 
governing mediation settlement conferences in South Carolina. 
(8) To be certified as an Arbitrator, a person must also: 
(A) Have served as a Master-in-Equity, Circuit or Appellate Court 
Judge; or 
(B) Have completed a minimum of six (6) hours in a civil arbitration 
training program approved by the Board, or any other training 
program attended prior to the promulgation of these rules or attended 
in other states and approved by the Board; and 
(C) Demonstrate familiarity with the statutes, rules and practice 
governing arbitration hearings in South Carolina. 
(c) Certification under Prior Versions of Rule 19. Persons who were 
certified under a prior version of Rule 19 may be recertified in accordance 
with Section V(B)(7), Appendix G to Part IV, SCACR. However, a certified 
neutral who is decertified or whose certification lapses due to a failure to
seek recertification must file a new application and meet the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this rule to be certified.   
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the of Matter Scott Christen Allmon, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case Nos. 2016-000209 and 2016-000163 
ORDER 
On May 22, 2013, the Court administratively suspended petitioner pursuant to Rule 
419(d)(2) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  On January 15, 
2014, the Court accepted an Agreement for Discipline by Consent entered into 
between petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and suspended petitioner 
from the practice of law for one year retroactive to January 16, 2013, the date of 
petitioner's interim suspension.  In the Matter of Allmon, 407 S.C. 24, 753 S.E.2d 
544 (2014). Petitioner has now filed a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 
419(e), SCACR, and a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules 
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413, SCACR.   
After thorough consideration of the entire record, the Court grants both Petitions 
for Reinstatement. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
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We would deny both Petitions for Reinstatement.   
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
October 21, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of J. Fitzgerald O'Connor, Jr., Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001747 
 
ORDER 
Respondent has submitted a Motion to Resign in Lieu of Discipline pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in 
Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  We grant the 
Motion to Resign in Lieu of Discipline.  In accordance with the provisions of Rule 
35, RLDE, respondent's resignation shall be permanent.    
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, and 
shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to Practice Law to the Clerk of 
Court. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 21, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter George Constantine Holmes, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002057 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim 
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
 
Within fifteen (15) days of this order, respondent shall serve and file the affidavit 
required by Rule 30, RLDE. Should respondent fail to timely file the required 
affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court as 
provided by Rule 30, RLDE.    
 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
                     FOR THE COURT 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
October 24, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Rent-A-Center West Inc., Appellant,  
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Revenue, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-208608 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
	
Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 5447 

Heard March 16, 2016 – Filed October 26, 2016 

 REVERSED 
John C. Von Lehe, Jr. and Bryson Moore Geer, both of 
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of 
Charleston, for Appellant. 
William J. Condon, Jr. and Sean Gordon Ryan, both of 
the South Carolina Department of Revenue, of Columbia, 
for Respondent. 
KONDUROS, J.:  Rent-A-Center West Inc. (RAC West) appeals the 
administrative law court's (ALC) finding the standard statutory apportionment 
formula did not fairly represent its business activities in South Carolina and the 
Department of Revenue's (the DOR) alternative apportionment method for 
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calculating its income tax was reasonable.  It also maintains the ALC erred in 
finding it was not a unitary business.  It further asserts the ALC erred by 
concluding the DOR did not violate its constitutional rights.  We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case involves the assessment of corporate income tax on RAC West, a 
subsidiary of the Rent-A-Center Inc. business.  Rent-A-Center is a rent-to-own 
business, providing consumer goods to customers for rent.  Rent-A-Center East 
Inc. (RAC East) owns and operates retail stores in eastern states including South 
Carolina and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rent-A-Center.  RAC East has two 
wholly-owned subsidiaries: RAC West, which owns and operates retail stores in 
western states, and Rent-A-Center Texas LP, which owns and operates retail stores 
in Texas and provides management services.  RAC West does not operate any 
retail stores in South Carolina, but it owns and licenses the Rent-A-Center 
intellectual property, including the trademarks and trade names to all other Rent-A-
Center companies.  These royalty payments for the use of the intellectual property 
by the South Carolina stores are RAC West's only activity in the state.  This 
arrangement was formalized in a licensing agreement between RAC West and 
RAC East. The licensing agreement sets the amount of a royalty fee equal to 3% 
of the gross revenues of the RAC East stores, an amount based upon a transfer 
pricing study.1 
RAC West filed their corporate income tax returns for 2003, 2004, and 2005 using 
the three-factor apportionment formula, consisting of property, payroll, and sales.
The DOR audited RAC West's 2003-2005 initial tax returns and found RAC West 
owed an additional $144,971 in corporate income tax; $35,086 in interest; and 
$36,243 in penalties for the period of 2003-2005.  According to the DOR, RAC 
West's only income in South Carolina was the royalty income it obtained from
RAC East. The DOR applied an alternative apportionment method pursuant to 
section 12-6-2320(A) of the South Carolina Code, which it stated "more fairly 
represent[ed] the taxpayer's activity in South Carolina."  The DOR based this 
1 In the relevant years, this 3% amounted to $830,247 in 2003; $861,437 in 2004; 
and $844,348.13 in 2005. 
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alternative apportionment method on RAC West's 3% royalty agreement with RAC 
East.
RAC West filed an appeal and requested a hearing before the ALC.  One month 
prior to the hearing, RAC West filed amended South Carolina income tax returns, 
changing the method from the three-factor apportionment formula for dealers of 
tangible personal property to the gross-receipts method under section 12-6-2290 of 
the South Carolina Code.2  This single-factor apportionment formula required RAC 
West to pay an additional $1,326 in taxes to what it had previously paid.   
The ALC held a hearing on August 10 and 11, 2011.  The DOR argued RAC West 
diluted the sales/gross receipts ratio by including the retail sales of RAC West in 
the denominator because no retail sales are in the numerator, as RAC West's only 
activity in South Carolina is the licensing of the intellectual property.  According 
to testimony from Dr. Glenn Harrison, the DOR's expert witness on law and 
economics, the gross receipts ratio did not provide an accurate reflection of the 
economic connection of RAC West to South Carolina.  Dr. Harrison indicated 
including royalty receipts in the numerator of the ratio while including both total 
royalty and total retail receipts in the denominator was like putting apples in the 
numerator and apples and oranges in the denominator.  He further testified the 
DOR's alternative method was economically reasonable and excluding the retail 
operations from the calculations was essential in order to "come up with a tax 
burden that fairly represented the economic nexus of the entity with South 
Carolina." Additionally, Dr. Harrison indicated even if RAC West was a unitary 
business, it should still be able to separate its accounts.
RAC West argued there is a unitary relationship between the business activities of 
the retail stores in the western states and the licensing of intellectual property in 
other states because the same management is over both businesses and the stores 
contribute to the profitability of the intellectual property and vice versa.  Further, it 
2 Under section 12-6-2290 of the South Carolina Code (2014), a taxpayer 
apportions its net income by using a ratio in which the numerator is its gross 
receipts from within South Carolina during the taxable year and the denominator is 
its total gross receipts from all states during the taxable year. 
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argued it does not separately track the costs of the intellectual property alone and 
this South Carolina audit was the first time it had been asked to do so.
According to RAC West's expert economist, Dr. Ronald P. Wilder, and tax policy 
expert, Professor Richard Pomp, RAC West was a single unitary business based 
upon the mutual interdependence of the trademark and retail business.  Dr. Wilder
was asked his opinion of whether or not the standard apportionment formula fairly 
represented the extent of RAC West's activities in the state, and he responded that
it did. Dr. Wilder based this "conclusion on the fact that RAC West uses its total 
corporation income as what is to be apportioned [and t]hat the use of corporation 
net income corresponds to the economic concept of profit on which taxable income 
should be based."  When asked what would result if the retail sales from RAC 
West were not included in the denominator of the apportionment formula, Dr. 
Wilder explained that because RAC West is a unitary business, the "separate 
accounting cannot accurately measure the activities of RAC West."  Professor 
Pomp explained the standard apportionment worked the way it was supposed to in 
this case. He stated, "That's not a defect.  That's not anything unusual, out of the 
ordinary." Further, he found an "inextricable link" and "synergy" between the 
value of the intellectual property and the profitability of the retail store business.  
Joseph P. Southard, a former employee of the DOR who worked specifically on the 
RAC West audit, testified the audit began as a routine audit of Rent-A-Center as a 
whole. When asked why the DOR did not make an assessment based on the 
standard apportionment formula, Southard responded the gross receipts formula 
"didn't fit into the definition," so the DOR "had to come up with kind of a hybrid."  
The ALC found for the DOR on all issues except the penalty, which it dismissed.  
Specifically, the ALC found (1) the DOR demonstrated RAC West's
apportionment formula failed to fairly represent its business in South Carolina; (2) 
the DOR's proposed alternative apportionment method was reasonable in light of 
RAC West's business activities in South Carolina; (3) the imposition of an 
alternative method in this case did not violate the Constitution; (4) RAC West did 
not substantiate any expenses, therefore it was not entitled to deduct any expenses; 
and (5) RAC West was not liable for substantial understatement penalties.  
RAC West filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ALC denied.  RAC West 
filed a Notice of Appeal and shortly thereafter requested, with the DOR's consent, 
a stay of the matter until a final decision was made in Carmax Auto Superstores 
45
	
 
 
                                        
 
 
West Coast, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue (Carmax I), 397 S.C. 
604, 725 S.E.2d 711 (Ct. App. 2012), aff'd as modified, 411 S.C. 79, 767 S.E.2d 
195 (2014). The parties asserted some or all of the issues could be decided or 
affected by the final decision in that case.  This court granted the stay on April 16, 
2012. Following a decision by the supreme court,3 this appeal proceeded. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The review of the [ALC]'s order must be confined to the 
record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence 
on questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the 
decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it 
may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive 
rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the 
finding, conclusion, or decision is: 
 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
 
(d) affected by other error of law; 
 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 
 
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 
3 Carmax Auto Superstores W. Coast, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue (Carmax II), 
411 S.C. 79, 767 S.E.2d 195 (2014).
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"In reaching a decision in a contested violation matter, the ALC serves as the sole 
finder of fact in the de novo contested case proceeding." S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. 
Sandalwood Soc. Club, 399 S.C. 267, 279, 731 S.E.2d 330, 337 (Ct. App. 2012).  
"The Rules of Procedure for the Administrative Law Judge Division require that 
the AL[C] make independent findings of fact in contested case hearings, and the 
Administrative Procedures Act clearly contemplates that the AL[C] will make [its] 
own findings of fact in a contested case hearing."  Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 
S.C. 528, 534, 489 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).  When the 
evidence conflicts on an issue, the court's substantial evidence standard of review 
defers to the findings of the fact-finder. Risher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 393 S.C. 198, 210, 712 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2011).
"The decision of the [ALC] should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by 
substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law."  Original Blue Ribbon 
Taxi Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 604, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 
(Ct. App. 2008). "A reviewing court may reverse or modify an administrative 
decision if the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence."  Risher,
393 S.C. at 210, 712 S.E.2d at 434.  "Substantial evidence is 'evidence which, 
considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the 
conclusion that the administrative agency reached.'"  Se. Res. Recovery, Inc. v. S.C. 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 358 S.C. 402, 407, 595 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2004) 
(quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981)).  
Substantial evidence . . . is more than a mere scintilla of evidence."  Original Blue 
Ribbon Taxi Corp., 380 S.C. at 605, 670 S.E.2d at 676. 
"A statutory provision should be given a reasonable and practical construction 
consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute."  Lockwood Greene 
Eng'rs, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 293 S.C. 447, 449, 361 S.E.2d 346, 347 (Ct. App. 
1987). "[T]he construction of a statute by the agency charged with its 
administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be 
overruled absent compelling reasons."  Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002) (alteration by court) 
(quoting Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 
S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987)). 
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
RAC West argues the ALC erred by finding the standard statutory apportionment 
formula did not fairly represent RAC West's business activities in South Carolina.  
We agree. 
 
If a taxpayer is transacting or conducting business partly 
within and partly without this State, the South Carolina 
income tax is imposed upon a base which reasonably 
represents the proportion of the trade or business carried 
on within this State.  A taxpayer subject to taxation under 
this section is considered to have been transacting or 
conducting business partly within and partly without the 
State if the taxpayer is subject to a net income tax or a 
franchise tax measured by net income in another state, 
the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the 
United States, or a foreign country, or would be subject 
to the net income tax in any other taxing jurisdiction if 
the other taxing jurisdiction adopted the net income tax 
laws of this State. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2210(B) (2014). 
 
For profits or income of a taxpayer derived from sources like those here, "the 
taxpayer shall apportion its remaining net income using a fraction in which the 
numerator is gross receipts from within this State during the taxable year and the 
denominator is total gross receipts from everywhere during the taxable year."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 12-6-2290 (2014). 
 
If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this 
chapter do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's 
business activity in this State, the taxpayer may petition 
for, or the department may require, in respect to all or 
any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable: 
 
(1) separate accounting; 
(2) the exclusion of one or more of the factors; 
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(3) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which 
will fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in the 
State; or 
(4) the employment of any other method to effectuate an 
equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's 
income. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2320(A) (2014). 
 
In South Carolina, corporate income tax "is imposed 
annually at the rate of five percent on the South Carolina 
taxable income of every corporation . . . transacting, 
conducting, or doing business within this State or having 
income within this State, regardless of whether these 
activities are carried on in intrastate, interstate, or foreign 
commerce."   
 
Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 85-86, 767 S.E.2d at 198 (alteration by court) (quoting S.C. 
Code Ann. § 12-6-530 (2014)).  "A corporation's taxable income in South Carolina 
is computed using the Internal Revenue Code with modifications as provided by 
South Carolina law, and this amount is 'subject to allocation and apportionment as 
provided in Article 17 of this chapter.'"  Media Gen. Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't 
of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 145, 694 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2010) (quoting S.C. Code 
Ann. § 12-6-580). "When 'a taxpayer is transacting or conducting business partly 
within and partly without this State, the South Carolina income tax is imposed 
upon a base which reasonably represents the proportion of the trade or business 
carried on within this State.'"  Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 86, 767 S.E.2d at 198 
(quoting § 12-6-2210(B)). 
 
"Article 17, entitled 'Allocation and Apportionment,' 
provides certain income that is not related to business 
activity in South Carolina must be directly allocated to a 
taxpayer and is not subject to apportionment."  Any 
income "remaining after allocation is apportioned in 
accordance with the general apportionment statute, 
section 12-6-2250, or one of the special apportionment 
formulas" provided in [s]ections 12-6-2290 through 12-
6[-]2310.  
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Id. (quoting Media Gen. Commc'ns, 388 S.C. at 145, 694 S.E.2d at 528). 
"The purpose of the allocation statutes is to provide for imposition of South 
Carolina income tax 'upon a base which reasonably represents the proportion of the 
trade or business carried on within this State.'" Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc. v. 
S.C. Tax Comm'n, 293 S.C. 447, 449, 361 S.E.2d 346, 347 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting Hertz Corp. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 246 S.C. 92, 95, 142 S.E.2d 445, 446 
(1965)). Our supreme court has held that "the apportionment formula is a 
reasonable basis for establishing the income tax of corporations which . . . do 
business on a multistate level." Eastman Kodak Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 308 S.C. 
415, 419, 418 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1992). 
"[T]he statutory apportionment method found in section 12-6-2290 of the South 
Carolina Code . . . [is] commonly referred to as the 'gross receipts method' . . . ." 
Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 83, 767 S.E.2d at 197.  "This method . . . calculates a 
multistate taxpayer's taxes due by creating an apportionment ratio that divides the 
taxpayer's receipts from financing and intangibles in South Carolina by the 
taxpayer's receipts from financing, intangibles, and retail sales everywhere else the 
taxpayer does business." Id.
In CarMax, the corporate structure of CarMax was somewhat similar to Rent-A-
Center's. 
In 2002, CarMax became a separate, publicly-traded 
holding company of CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc., 
(CarMax East) and CarMax West, two wholly owned 
subsidiaries, which primarily performed retail automobile 
sales. CarMax East owned and operated the used car 
superstores on the East Coast and in the Midwest, 
including South Carolina, and managed all of the 
financial operations and corporate overhead of CarMax.  
CarMax West owned and operated the used car
superstores on the West Coast and owned all of the 
intellectual property.  From 2002-2004, CarMax East 
paid royalties to CarMax West for the use of this 
intellectual property in accordance with a licensing 
agreement.
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Id. at 81-82, 767 S.E.2d at 196. 
In 2004, CarMax reorganized its corporate structure, and 
created CarMax Business Services, LLC (CBS), a multi-
member limited liability company with two members: 
CarMax East and CarMax West. CarMax East 
contributed the financing operations and corporate 
overhead management to the partnership, and CarMax 
West contributed the intellectual property.  Ownership 
percentages of CBS were based on the value of the assets 
contributed, and the members' income derives from their 
respective percentages of ownership.
After the restructuring, CarMax East and CarMax West 
became vehicle retailers only, and CBS began to provide 
all of the corporate overhead services, house financing 
operations through its financing arm (CAF), and manage 
the intellectual property for its members.  Both CarMax 
East and CarMax West pay CBS a management fee for 
these services. 
Id. at 82, 767 S.E.2d at 196 (footnote omitted). 
CarMax West claim[ed] that it ha[d] no financial 
connection to South Carolina outside of royalty payments 
from CarMax East.  From 2002-2004, CarMax East made 
direct payments to CarMax West for use of the 
intellectual property; and since 2004, CarMax East has 
made management fee payments to CBS on a per-
vehicle-sold basis, and CAF has generated further 
financing revenue in South Carolina.  Because of its 
status as an LLC, CBS is taxed as a partnership; 
therefore, both sources of revenue "flow through" CBS to 
its members, and thus indirectly, to CarMax West. 
Id.
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"CarMax West filed the amended tax returns in question, using the statutory 
apportionment method found in section 12-6-2290 of the South Carolina Code."  
Id. at 83, 767 S.E.2d at 197. That method "requires a taxpayer to 'apportion its . . . 
net income using a fraction in which the numerator is gross receipts from within 
this State during the taxable year and the denominator is total gross receipts from 
everywhere during the taxable year.'" Id. at 86, 767 S.E.2d at 198 (alteration by 
court) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2290).  "CarMax West then multiplied its 
net income by the apportionment ratio, and multiplied that number by South 
Carolina's income tax rate to arrive at its South Carolina income tax."  Id. at 83, 
767 S.E.2d at 197. 
The DOR "rejected CarMax West's use of the gross receipts method, claiming it 
did not fairly represent the extent of CarMax West's business dealings in South 
Carolina. Rather, the [DOR] proposed an alternate apportionment method
pursuant to section 12-6-2320(A)(4) of the South Carolina Code."  Id. 
The [DOR]'s proposed alternative formula employed an 
apportionment ratio of CarMax West's South Carolina 
income from intangibles and financing divided by 
CarMax West's intangibles and financing income from
everywhere else that it does business.  According to the 
[DOR], this alternative formula focused on CarMax 
West's actual business activity in South Carolina.  The 
[DOR] sought to prevent CarMax West from diluting its 
income by inflating the denominator of its apportionment 
ratio with sales from its Western retail operations. 
Furthermore, the [DOR] sought to include the income 
from the sale of securitized consumer lending contracts 
in CarMax West's South Carolina income.  
Id. at 84, 767 S.E.2d at 197. 
"[T]he statutory language of section 12-6-2320(A) clearly evinces a two-part 
analysis . . . ." Id. at 88, 767 S.E.2d at 199.   
[W]hen a party seeks to deviate from a statutory formula 
under section 12-6-2320(A), the proponent of the 
alternate formula bears the burden of proving by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the statutory 
formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business 
activity in South Carolina and (2) its alternative 
accounting method is reasonable. 
 
Id. at 89, 767 S.E.2d at 200. 
 
[W]he[n] the [DOR] alone is arguing that the statutory 
formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business 
in South Carolina[, ]the [DOR] bears the burden to prove 
(1) that the statutory formula does not fairly represent 
CarMax West's business activity in South Carolina and 
(2) that the proposed alternative formula is reasonable.   
 
Id. at 89-90, 767 S.E.2d at 200 (citing St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. State, 385 
A.2d 215, 217 (N.H. 1978) (holding "an alternative formula is the exception, and 
the party who wants to use an alternative formula accordingly has the burden of 
showing that the alternative is appropriate"); Donald M. Drake Co. v. Dep't of 
Revenue, 500 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Or. 1972) (holding "the use of any method other 
than apportionment should be exceptional" and the party seeking to use an 
alternative method bears the burden of proof)).  The threshold issue is whether the 
statutory formula fairly represents a taxpayer's business activity within South 
Carolina. Id. at 90, 767 S.E.2d at 200. 
 
In Eastman Kodak Co., the court determined: 
 
Since the safe harbor lease transactions were a part of 
Kodak's general business, they were properly included in 
the denominator of the apportionment formula in 
computing Kodak's national net income from payroll, 
property, and sales.  The fact that a very small percentage 
of the leased assets are located in South Carolina is 
accounted for in the numerator of the apportionment 
formula in which Kodak's payroll, property, and sales in 
this state are computed.  Therefore, the apportionment 
formula reflects a "reasonable representation" of Kodak's 
business in this state. 
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308 S.C. at 419, 418 S.E.2d at 544.
In arriving at its decision in CarMax, 
the ALC relied on testimony from an auditor that the 
business structure of CarMax West and CBS is often 
"linked with tax minimization strategies."  Furthermore, 
the ALC relied on evidence regarding the sourcing of 
income, and the fact that CarMax West's apportionment 
ratio yielded a significantly lower tax than that of 
CarMax East, to support its determination that CarMax 
West's income was diluted.  This was the extent of the 
evidence offered by the [DOR] to prove the contention 
that the statutory formula did not fairly represent CarMax 
West's business activity in South Carolina, other than 
bald assertions by its witnesses that it satisfied this 
threshold question.
Even if these findings accurately characterize CarMax 
West's motives, they do not provide a sound evidentiary 
basis to support the conclusion that the statutory formula 
did not fairly represent CarMax West's business in South 
Carolina. See St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 385 A.2d at 
217 ("Merely because the use of an alternative form of 
computation produces a higher business activity 
attributable to New Hampshire, is not in and of itself a 
sufficient reason for deviating from the legislatively 
mandated formula." (citations omitted)). 
 Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 90-91, 767 S.E.2d at 201. 
In this case, the burden was on the DOR to show the statutory formula did not 
fairly represent RAC West's business activity in South Carolina.  The DOR 
presented the same level of evidence in this case as in CarMax. Based on the 
supreme court's holding in CarMax the evidence was insufficient to meet the 
DOR's burden for the threshold issue, we likewise conclude the DOR failed to 
meet its burden here. Substantial evidence does not support finding the statutory 
apportionment method fairly reflected RAC West's business activities in South 
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Carolina. The DOR auditor, Southard, testified the investigation started because 
Rent-A-Center was comprised of multiple entities and he believed a management 
services fee was too high. He did not point to any specific evidence the standard 
apportionment method did not fairly represent RAC West's business activities.  
Additionally, the DOR's expert, Dr. Harrison, indicated excluding the retail 
operations from the calculations was essential to "come up with a tax burden that 
fairly represented the economic nexus of the entity with South Carolina."  See id. at
91, 767 S.E.2d at 201 (holding bald assertions by the DOR's witnesses that it 
satisfied the threshold question was not enough to meet its burden).  Dr. Harrison 
testified that using the standard apportionment method would be like having apples
in the numerator, while having apples and oranges in the denominator.  However, 
this is how the apportionment method is intended to work, as Professor Pomp
testified. A very small amount of RAC West's business comes from the royalties; 
therefore, this should only comprise a small amount of its taxes.  See Eastman 
Kodak Co., 308 S.C. at 419, 418 S.E.2d at 544 ("The fact that a very small 
percentage of the leased assets are located in South Carolina is accounted for in the 
numerator of the apportionment formula in which Kodak's payroll, property, and 
sales in this state are computed.  Therefore, the apportionment formula reflects a 
'reasonable representation' of Kodak's business in this state.").  Accordingly, 
substantial evidence does not support the ALC's finding the DOR met its burden. 
Additionally, because the DOR did not meet its burden in proving the threshold 
issue of whether the statutory formula fairly represented RAC West's business 
activities in the state, we need not decide whether the ALC erred in finding the 
DOR's alternative method was reasonable.  See Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 90, 767 
S.E.2d at 200 (holding the threshold issue is whether the statutory formula fairly 
represents a taxpayer's business activity within South Carolina); see also Futch v. 
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its 
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).  Accordingly, the ALC's 
decision is 
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REVERSED. 4
	
HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 

4 RAC West also argues the ALC erred in (1) finding RAC West did not operate a 
unitary business when the uncontested evidence established it was unitary; (2) 
allowing the DOR to apply a separate accounting to a unitary business; and (3) 
concluding the DOR did not violate RAC West's constitutional rights by applying 
separate accounting to a unitary business.  In CarMax, similar additional issues 
were raised. See Carmax II, 411 S.C. at 84-85, 767 S.E.2d at 197 ("On appeal, 
CarMax West argued the ALC erred in . . . failing to consider that CarMax West 
operates a unitary business and permitting the [DOR] to use separate accounting 
procedures when calculating tax liability of a unitary business . . . and . . . finding 
that the [DOR] did not violate CarMax West's constitutional rights by applying a 
separate accounting to a unitary business and by sourcing financing receipts to 
South Carolina."). The court in Carmax II determined it did not need to reach 
these issues based on its decision.  Based on our decision above, like Carmax II, 
we need not address RAC West's remaining issues.  See id. at 91 n.11, 767 S.E.2d 
at 201 n.11 ("We need not reach . . . CarMax West's remaining issues on appeal, as 
they were all raised as defenses to the [DOR]'s use of an alternative apportionment 
method, and the proper allocation of the burden of proof resolves this appeal."
(citing Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598)).
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MCDONALD, J.:  The State of South Carolina (the State) appeals the post-
conviction relief (PCR) court's order granting Respondent Shanna M. Kranchick's
application for PCR. The State argues the PCR court erred in determining that 
Kranchick's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the 
State's forensic toxicologist's testimony as to the effects of the marijuana, 
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antihistamines, and cough suppressant found in Kranchick's blood after the 
accident. We reverse and reinstate Respondent's conviction and sentence.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on January 23, 2002, Kranchick lost control of the 
Ford Taurus she was driving eastbound on Interstate 20 in Northeast Richland 
County. After swerving off the road, Kranchick overcorrected and collided with 
the rear of a bobtail truck. The impact caused the truck to spin into the median, 
over the median guardrail cables, and into the path of an oncoming tractor trailer 
hauling sand. The smaller truck flipped onto its roof, killing the driver, Gene 
Croft, at the scene. Croft's passenger and the driver of the tractor trailer were 
severely and permanently injured in the accident.   
On March 20, 2002, the Richland County grand jury indicted Kranchick for one 
count of felony driving under the influence (DUI) causing death and one count of 
felony DUI causing great bodily injury.  Kranchick's first jury trial resulted in a 
mistrial.1  Following a second jury trial, Kranchick was convicted and sentenced to 
thirteen years of imprisonment for felony DUI causing death and fifteen years of 
imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years' probation, for felony DUI 
causing great bodily injury.2  The PCR court subsequently granted Kranchick's 
application for post-conviction relief, finding "that the toxicologist was not 
sufficiently qualified to testify about the effects of drugs or when they are 
consumed." At issue is whether the PCR court erred in finding Kranchick's trial 
counsel ineffective for failing to object to a portion of the toxicologist's testimony.  
ANALYSIS 
"This Court will uphold the findings of the PCR judge when there is any evidence 
of probative value to support them, and it will reverse the PCR judge's decision 
when it is controlled by an error of law."  McHam v. State, 404 S.C. 465, 473, 746 
1 Fifth Circuit Public Defender Douglas Strickler represented Kranchick in the first 
trial. Kranchick was represented primarily by an Assistant Public Defender (trial 
counsel) in the second trial.   
2 These sentences are consecutive to an unrelated armed robbery sentence of 
twelve years' imprisonment.
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S.E.2d 41, 45 (2013) (quoting Suber v. State, 371 S.C. 554, 558–59, 640 S.E.2d 
884, 886 (2007)). In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
an applicant must prove (1) counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance 
under prevailing professional norms and (2) counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the applicant's case.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 
(1984). 
I. Deficient Performance 
At Kranchick's  trial, forensic toxicologist Gregory Rock testified that he received 
a Bachelor of Science degree in medical technology from the University of South 
Carolina and additional training through the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division's (SLED's) toxicology program, "which consists of about a year-long 
training where [he] under[went] book work[,] oral testing[,] and written testing."  
Rock further testified that he worked as a forensic toxicologist at SLED for 
approximately two and one-half years following his training and that SLED is 
accredited by the American Society of Crime Lab Directors.  Without objection, 
the trial court qualified Rock as an expert "in the field of forensic toxicology."   
Rock did not testify as to his education, experience, or knowledge relating to the 
physical or mental effects of drugs on the human body, and trial counsel did not 
object when he subsequently testified as to the effects of the "significant amount of 
[marijuana] metabolite" and "very significant" amounts of cough suppressant and 
antihistamine found in Kranchick's blood following the accident.   
At the PCR hearing, Strickler3 testified that he "didn't hear anything in the 
testimony that qualified [Rock] in regard to the psychopharmacological effects of 
marijuana or the other [drugs] in this case."  Thus, PCR counsel asserted trial 
counsel should have objected to Rock's testimony about the effects of the drugs on 
Kranchick as "outside the bounds of [Rock's] expertise."  The State argued trial 
counsel was not deficient in failing to object because the definition of "toxicology" 
specifically "allows for the effects of drugs."  See Toxicology, Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (defining "toxicology" as "[t]he science of poisons; that 
3 Trial counsel was not called to testify at the PCR hearing as she now lives out of 
state. 
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department of medical science which treats poisons, their effects, their recognition, 
their antidotes, and generally of the diagnosis and therapeutics of poisoning").  
We find there is evidence in the record to support the PCR court's determination 
that "the State presented insufficient qualifications for the toxicologist to testify 
concerning the mental or physical effects of drugs on a person."  See State v. 
Priester, 301 S.C. 165, 167, 391 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1990) (concluding the trial court 
erred in allowing a lab technologist, who admitted "he had no training whatsoever 
in determining the effect of alcohol upon the human system" to testify regarding 
the effects of drugs and alcohol); cf. State v. White, 311 S.C. 289, 295, 428 S.E.2d 
740, 743 (Ct. App.1993) (concluding the trial court did not err in allowing the
forensic toxicologist, who was qualified as an expert witness, to give an opinion 
concerning the effects of benzodiazepine when used in combination with alcohol 
after he admitted that different "benzos" have different effects and that he did not 
know which benzodiazepine the defendant had ingested).  
Thus, under our deferential standard of review, we affirm the PCR court's holding 
that trial counsel's failure to object to the testimony exceeding Rock's presented 
qualifications fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  However, this 
does not conclude our analysis because we must determine whether Kranchick 
suffered any prejudice as a result of the admission of this testimony. 
II. Prejudice 
The State argues that even if the PCR court correctly determined trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to object to this portion of Rock's testimony, Kranchick cannot 
demonstrate the required resulting prejudice because the record establishes Rock 
was qualified to testify about the effects of the drugs.  Moreover, there was 
overwhelming evidence of Kranchick's guilt. The State further contends that trial 
counsel's failure to object to the portion of Rock's testimony exceeding his 
qualifications, as presented at trial, had no reasonable impact on the outcome of the 
case. 
A. Forensic Toxicologist Qualifications and Testimony  
Rock explained that his analysis of Kranchick's urine and blood samples indicated 
she had ingested large quantities of marijuana as well as cough suppressant and 
antihistamine (collectively, cold medicine) prior to the accident.  Rock tested both 
urine and blood samples; when he did not find any alcohol in Kranchick's blood, he
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screened her urine for legal and illegal drugs.  As the analysis revealed the 
presence of marijuana metabolite, antihistamine, and cough suppressant, Rock 
tested her blood to determine specific quantities.   
Rock found a "significant amount of [marijuana] metabolite" in Kranchick's blood, 
which he explained was "more than the normal amount that we typically see."  
Specifically, the blood testing revealed sixty micrograms of marijuana metabolite 
per liter of blood. Based on the amount of marijuana metabolite found in her 
blood, Rock opined that Kranchick had ingested marijuana "within the last eight 
hours." Rock testified that although the metabolite itself does not impair a person's 
ability to drive, a person's ability to drive would be impaired by the amount of 
marijuana that must have been ingested to produce such a significant amount of 
metabolite. On cross-examination, Rock admitted his testing would have revealed 
the presence of THC—the primary mind-altering ingredient in marijuana—if the 
marijuana were still active in Kranchick's system.  Rock also admitted that 
Kranchick could have ingested the marijuana nine to fourteen hours prior to the 
incident and up to twenty-four hours prior to the incident if she were a "chronic 
user" who smoked marijuana daily.   
In addition to the marijuana metabolite, Rock found "very significant" amounts of 
cough suppressant and antihistamine in Kranchick's blood. Testing revealed 0.5 
milligrams of antihistamine per liter of Kranchick's blood, 1.3 milligrams of 
methorphan (cough suppressant) per liter of blood, and 0.24 milligrams of 
methorphinan (cough suppressant) per liter of blood.  Rock testified that when used 
for therapeutic reasons, cold medicine is "normally seen or taken at very low 
dosages, approximately anywhere from 0.01 to 0.05 [milligrams]."  However, "[i]n 
this case, they were extremely high, almost twenty to thirty times that level."  Rock 
explained that a person might take twenty to thirty doses of cold medicine 
accidentally or they may take it to get high.  Rock further explained that the 
possible effects of cold medicine at these levels include euphoria, hallucinations, 
sedation, and muscle relaxation.  With regard to the effects from the antihistamine 
alone, Rock stated, "You would tend to have possibly hallucinogenic effects.  You 
would have a sedative effect. You would have a very [] muscle relaxing effect." 
Rock testified that ingesting twenty to thirty times the normal amount of either 
cough suppressant or antihistamine would impair a person's ability to drive. 
Finally, Rock opined that the combination of marijuana and cold medicine in these 
amounts would "build on each other.  They have what's called an additive effect."  
He testified that with such a combination of drugs "you're going to get, not 
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necessarily twice the effect, but you have more effect [than] just one alone."  Rock 
concluded that a person taking these drugs in these amounts could not safely 
operate an automobile, and that Kranchick "would have definitely been impaired."
Trial counsel did not object to Rock's testimony as to the effects of marijuana 
combined with excessive doses of cold medicine.   
In State v. Martin, which also involved a defendant convicted of felony DUI 
resulting in death, this court concluded the trial court did not err in allowing a 
forensic toxicologist to testify as to the effects of drugs and alcohol on the body.  
391 S.C. 508, 512–13, 706 S.E.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2011).  Specifically, forensic 
toxicologist Brandon Landrum discussed the effects of alcohol on an individual at 
several blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels, explained the effects of 
marijuana and Xanax, and opined that an individual with a 0.167 BAC combined 
with marijuana and Xanax could not safely operate a motor vehicle.  Id. at 514, 
706 S.E.2d at 43. 
Landrum explained a forensic toxicologist analyzes 
"blood, urine, biological[,] and non-biological samples" 
for the presence of alcohol, drugs, and poisons.  After 
analyzing these samples, forensic toxicologists interpret 
the results for coroners, police officers, and courts.  
Interpreting these results involves an examination of how 
different levels of drugs and/or alcohol cause an 
individual to act or respond under their influence. 
Landrum also explained the extent of his training and 
education regarding the effects of alcohol and drugs on 
the body. Landrum received in-house training at 
[SLED], which involved studying the effects of drugs 
and alcohol on the body. Landrum's clinical chemistry 
rotation during his medical technology training included 
a section where he studied the impairing effects of drugs 
and alcohol. Landrum also attended classes at the drug 
recognition evaluation school at the police 
academy . . . . [, which] involved studying the behavior 
of individuals clinically dosed with certain amounts of 
alcohol. 
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Landrum further explained the difference between 
forensic toxicology and pharmacology.  According to 
Landrum, pharmacology involves testing for the presence 
or absence of drugs or alcohol and examining the 
interaction between different drugs and drugs and 
alcohol. Forensic toxicology "takes it a step further" and 
determines the level of impairment for courts.
Id. at 513–14, 706 S.E.2d at 42–43 (first alteration in original). 
On appeal, the Martin defendant argued the witness's training and expertise as a 
forensic toxicologist were insufficient to permit him to render an opinion regarding 
the effects of drugs and alcohol on the body.  Id. at 514, 706 S.E.2d at 42. This 
court disagreed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 
Landrum to so testify. Id. at 514–15, 706 S.E.2d at 43.  Specifically, the Martin
court relied upon the witness's testimony as to his education and experience, as 
well as his explanation that a forensic toxicologist tests samples for the presence of
alcohol and drugs and then interprets the findings to determine an individual's
degree of impairment.  Id. at 515, 706 S.E.2d at 43. The court further noted the 
defendant's objections to the toxicologist's qualifications went to the weight of his 
testimony and not its admissibility.  Id. at 515–16, 706 S.E.2d at 43–44. Finally, 
the court held that even if the trial court erred in permitting the testimony about the 
effects of the drugs and alcohol upon the driver, the defendant was not prejudiced 
because the State was entitled to an inference that the defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol as his BAC was 0.167 percent.  Id. at 515, 706 S.E.2d at 43 
(citing S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(G)(3) (Supp. 2012), which provides that in a 
prosecution for felony DUI, a BAC of greater than .08 percent gives rise to an 
inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol). 
Likewise, in State v. White, this court found the circuit court did not err in allowing 
a "state forensic toxicologist" to give an opinion "concerning the rate at which a 
150-pound man would eliminate alcohol and in allowing him to testify as to the 
effects of benzodiazepine when used in combination with alcohol."  311 S.C. 289, 
295, 428 S.E.2d 740, 743 (Ct. App. 1993).  There, the defendant contended the 
testimony was improper because the witness "admitted that different 'benzos' have 
different effects and he did not know which benzodiazepine White had taken."  Id. 
This court disagreed, determining that defendant's objections to the toxicologist's
testimony went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.  Id. at 295, 
428 S.E.2d at 743 (explaining that once a witness is qualified as an expert, any 
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question regarding the adequacy of the expert's knowledge goes to the weight of 
the testimony and not to its admissibility (citing State v. Nathari, 303 S.C. 188, 
195, 399 S.E.2d 597, 602 (Ct. App. 1990))). 
Although not specifically presented, Rock's education and experience are 
equivalent to the qualifications of the Martin forensic toxicologist. Here, the PCR 
court found, and Kranchick conceded, that "[Rock] was sufficiently qualified to 
testify regarding general toxicology as [a] 'person or scientist who analyzes 
biological specimens for the presence or absence of alcohol, drugs or other poisons 
that may be present.'"  Thus, it is likely that objections to Rock's further testimony 
concerning the effects of the drugs would have been futile because the objections 
would have addressed the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.  
Moreover, even if trial counsel had successfully objected, thus limiting Rock's
testimony to the mere presence of the drugs found in the blood testing, Kranchick
cannot establish the probability of a different result at trial.  Kranchick does not 
assert that Rock's testimony concerning the results of her blood testing was 
improper; thus, even if the trial court had limited Rock's testimony to an opinion as 
to the presence of the drugs—as opposed to their effect—there is no reasonable 
probability of a different result at trial.  The jury would still have heard evidence 
that Kranchick had twenty to thirty times the normal levels of antihistamine and 
cough suppressant—and significantly high levels of marijuana metabolite—in her 
system at the time of the accident.   
B. Other Evidence of Impairment 
Lance Corporal Jeffrey Baker of the South Carolina Highway Patrol confirmed 
Kranchick was the driver at the time of the accident.  When Baker first approached 
Kranchick at the scene, she was sitting in the driver's seat of the Ford Taurus but 
denied that she had been driving.  Once Baker interviewed the other occupants of 
the Taurus, however, Kranchick admitted she was the driver.  Baker testified 
Kranchick was confused about the direction in which she was traveling; appeared 
mellowed and disoriented; smelled of marijuana; and swayed and was unsteady on 
her feet. Kranchick refused to perform some of the field sobriety tests Officer 
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Baker attempted to administer; she failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test and a 
vertical gaze test; and her eyes were "glassy" and "bloodshot."4 
Baker opined Kranchick was "under the influence of something" due to her 
reactions to his questions, her appearance, her demeanor, her swaying, and her 
unsteadiness on her feet. Baker further explained that based on his interaction with 
Kranchick at the scene, he believed her ability to drive was impaired.  See State v. 
Ramey, 221 S.C. 10, 13–14, 68 S.E.2d 634, 635 (1952) (stating "a lay witness may 
testify whether or not in his opinion a person was drunk or sober on a given 
occasion on which he observed him" and "the weight of such testimony is for 
determination by the jury").
Other witnesses testified as to the erratic movement of the Taurus prior to the 
accident. Daniel Sharp, the injured passenger in decedent Croft's truck, first saw 
the Kranchick vehicle in the far left lane, in the gravel between the median and the 
roadway. Because the bobtail had a number of rearview mirrors, Sharp could see 
that the Taurus behind the truck was "losing it."  Tracy Proctor, who witnessed the 
accident, also observed "a car completely out of control."  
Sergeant Robert Lee of the South Carolina Highway Patrol's Multi-Disciplinary 
Accident Investigation Team (MAIT Unit) testified that no environmental factors 
contributed to the crash. Lee further testified that there was no indication of 
braking by Kranchick's vehicle until its yaw marks began in the area of the rumble 
strip next to the median.5  According to Sergeant James Day, another accident 
reconstructionist with the MAIT Unit, Kranchick "went so far over that she lost 
4 Trial counsel cross-examined Baker about whether the accident itself could have 
rendered Kranchick unsteady and disoriented.  Baker testified that emergency 
personnel put a Band-Aid on Kranchick's arm for an airbag burn, and he gave her 
some time to compose herself before attempting the field sobriety tests. 
5 A rumble strip is the strip that alerts a driver when he or she begins to run off the 
road. A yaw mark is made by an out-of-control vehicle when the rear tire out-
tracks the front tire. Here, the yaw marks started at the rumble strip and headed 
back to the center of the roadway.  A yaw cannot occur in a braking situation. 
There were no skid marks at the scene to indicate emergency braking by 
Kranchick's vehicle prior to the accident. 
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control of her vehicle at the rumble strip and she over-corrected, causing it to go 
out of control."   
In light of the overwhelming evidence that Kranchick was impaired at the time of 
the accident, we do not believe trial counsel's failure to object to Rock's testimony 
prejudiced the outcome of her case.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."); Huggler v. State, 360 S.C. 627, 634–35, 602 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2004) 
("[G]iven the witnesses' testimonies on direct provided overwhelming evidence 
that sexual abuse did in fact occur, counsel's failure to object to the admission of 
the written statements did not prejudice the outcome of Respondent's case."); State 
v. Goode, 305 S.C. 176, 179–80, 406 S.E.2d 391, 393–94 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
evidence supported a finding that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of an accident despite the lack of evidence concerning the defendant's
BAC, where the road was straight with clear visibility, the defendant had a strong 
odor of alcohol on his breath, alcohol was found in his blood, and there was expert 
testimony that the accident occurred in the oncoming vehicle's lane, with the 
defendant speeding and not braking before impact). 
Even without Rock's testimony "concerning the mental or physical effects of 
drugs" on Kranchick, we believe the State provided more than enough other 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude Kranchick was impaired at the time of 
this tragic accident. Had trial counsel objected to this testimony, the State would 
have further questioned Rock regarding his education, experience, and knowledge 
relating to the physical and mental effects of drugs on the human body.  Because 
we find Rock's qualifications are equivalent to those of the forensic toxicologist in 
State v. Martin, supra, his testimony regarding the effects of marijuana metabolite 
and cold medicine would have been appropriate and within his scope of expertise.  
Therefore, we hold the PCR court erred in determining that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors," the result of Kranchick's trial would have been different.   
Accordingly, the decision of the PCR court is 
REVERSED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT, J., concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.:  Ken Bruning and other homeowners in the Rookery 
subdivision of Cat Island (collectively, Appellants) in Beaufort County challenged 
the issuance of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit to Cat Island POA regarding stormwater management for Garfield Park, 
Phase 3, another subdivision on Cat Island.  Appellants appeal the Administrative 
Law Court's (ALC's) order affirming the issuance of the permit raising numerous 
grounds. We reverse in part based on the misinterpretation of a provision of the 
Coastal Management Program (CMP) Document.  We affirm other issues based on 
substantial evidence in the record, and we decline to address certain issues as they 
are no longer relevant in light of the disposition of other issues.  
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellants are homeowners in the Rookery subdivision of Cat Island where their 
property is adjacent to a seven-acre lake (the Lake) that served as a detention pond 
for stormwater management.  The dike creating the Lake was built between 1960 
to 1965, prior to the implementation of stormwater control regulations.  The Lake 
abuts Chowan Creek, which flows into the Atlantic Ocean.  Construction of the 
Garfield Park development began in 2004, after the implementation of stormwater 
management regulations.  Cat Island POA, the developer, obtained a NPDES 
permit that authorized detention of stormwater in the Lake as the stormwater 
management method for Garfield Park. 
In 2009, the dike began to crack, allowing the fresh water in the Lake to empty into 
Chowan Creek and permitting salt water to ebb and flow into and out of the Lake 
bed. The dike was never repaired, and the Lake transformed into a muddy, marshy 
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area. Cat Island POA sought a permit from the South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) to manage stormwater from Garfield 
park by using in-line filters or "curb inlet baskets."  These baskets would allow 
stormwater to flow through while catching sediment and other pollutants, 
preventing their passage into Chowan Creek.  As a result, the Lake would no 
longer serve as a detention pond and eventually would naturalize back into 
marshland. 
NPDES permit requests are reviewed by the Stormwater Permitting division of 
DHEC along with the Ocean and Coastal Resources Management Division 
(OCRM) of DHEC to ensure the proposed stormwater treatment is consistent with 
the CMP Document.  DHEC approved Cat Island POA's application for the 
baskets. Appellants petitioned DHEC to revoke the permit based on numerous 
regulatory violations and deleterious effects the abandonment of the Lake would 
have on the environment and their property. 
The DHEC Board (the Board) found the majority of Appellants' arguments 
unpersuasive.  However, the Board did agree with Appellants regarding a provision 
of the CMP Document governing stormwater runoff and proximity to shellfish 
beds. Because DHEC had not considered the location of the shellfish beds at high 
tide, the Board determined DHEC's measurements were insufficient to establish the 
required distance from the beds.  
Appellants challenged the Board's order as to the ruling on its numerous and varied 
alleged violations. DHEC and Cat Island POA (collectively, Respondents) 
appealed the portion of the Board's order finding they had not established sufficient 
distance from the shellfish beds to be consistent with the governing requirements 
of the CMP. The ALC reversed the Board's finding  DHEC's shellfish bed 
measurement was insufficient and affirmed the Board's other conclusions.  This 
resulted in the issuance of the permit being approved in toto. This appeal 
followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to section 1-23-610 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015), "[t]he 
review of the administrative law judge's order must be confined to the record.  The 
court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative law 
judge as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact."  Appellate courts confine 
their analysis of an ALC decision to whether it is: 
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(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) affected by other error of law; 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of 
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B). "In determining whether the ALC's decision was 
supported by substantial evidence, the court need only find, looking at the entire 
record on appeal, evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same 
conclusion as the ALC." Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 411 S.C. 16, 28, 766 S.E.2d 707, 715 (2014).  Still, the court may reverse 
the decision of the ALC if it is based on an error of law or in violation of a 
statutory provision. Id. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Interpretation of CMP Provision Section XIII(A)  
 
Appellants argue the ALC erred in concluding Cat Island POA's NPDES permit 
was compliant with Chapter III, Section C(3)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document 
entitled Stormwater Runoff Storage Requirements.  We agree. 
 
Section C(3)(XIII)(A) states: 
 
For all projects, regardless of size, which are located 
within one-half (1/2) mile of a receiving water body in 
the coastal zone, this criteria shall be storage of the first 
1/2 inch of runoff from the entire site or storage of the 
first one (1) inch of runoff from the built-upon portion of 
the property, whichever is greater.  Storage may be 
accomplished through retention, detention or infiltration 
systems, as appropriate for the specific site.   
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The ALC concluded the language in this provision is "permissive, not mandatory:  
'Storage may be accomplished through retention, detention or infiltration systems, 
as appropriate for the specific site.'" (emphasis added by ALC) (quoting Chapter 
III, Section C(3)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document). Respondents assert, and the 
ALC agreed, the use of the term "may" and the phrase "as appropriate for the 
specific site" provide DHEC with latitude to permit use of the curb inlet baskets 
proposed in Cat Island POA's permit application.1  We disagree.     
"The issue of interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court."  State v. 
Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 373, 655 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 2008).  "We recognize 
the court generally gives deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of 
an applicable statute or its own regulation.  Nevertheless, where . . . the plain 
language of the statute is contrary to the agency's interpretation, the Court will 
reject the agency's interpretation."  Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 354 S.C. 436, 440, 581 
S.E.2d 836, 838 (2003) (citation omitted).  "Regulations are interpreted using the 
same rules of construction as statutes."  Murphy v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 396 S.C. 633, 639, 723 S.E.2d 191, 195 (2012). "If the statute or 
regulation 'is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' the court then 
must give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute or regulation, 
assuming the interpretation is worthy of deference.'" Kiawah Dev. Partners, II, 
411 S.C. at 33, 766 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Generally, "[a] specific statutory
provision prevails over a more general one."  Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep't 
of Transp., 333 S.C. 464, 468, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999).  "The use of the word 
'may' signifies permission and generally means that the action spoken of is optional 
1 Additionally, the ALC relied upon Regulation 72-301(5) of the South Carolina 
Code (2012), which addresses "Best Management Practices" in finding this 
provision permissive.  Regulation 72-301(5) defines "Best Management Practices"
as "a wide range of management procedures, schedules of activities, prohibitions 
on practices and other management practices which have been demonstrated to 
effectively control the quality and/or quantity of stormwater runoff and which are 
compatible with the planned land use."  The ALC's order also cites to Regulation 
72-305(B)(3) of the South Carolina Code (2012), which indicates for sites less than 
ten disturbed acres, "the use of measures other than ponds to achieve water quality 
improvements are recommended."   
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or discretionary unless it appears to require that it be given any other meaning . . . 
." Kennedy v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 352-53, 549 S.E.2d 243, 250 
(2001) (holding "may" could not reasonably be interpreted to mean the inclusion of 
an employee's unpaid leave in the calculation of retirement benefits was optional, 
but merely contemplated that some retirees may not have unpaid leave to include); 
see also Robinson v. State, 276 S.C. 356, 358-59, 278 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1981) 
(interpreting "may" as a mandatory term based on the context and legislative 
history of a statute proscribing certain jurisdiction in magistrate's court); T.W. 
Morton Builders, Inc., v Buedingen, 316 S.C. 388, 402-03, 450 S.E.2d 87, 97 
(1994) (concluding "may" was mandatory in a provision dealing with attorney's
fees secured by a mechanic's lien).  "The canon of construction 'expressio unius est
exclusio alterius' or 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius' holds that 'to express or 
include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative.'" Hodges 
v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 86, 533 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2000).  When interpreting a law, 
courts must presume a futile act was not intended and that the law intends to 
accomplish something.  Sweat, 379 S.C. at 377, 655 S.E.2d at 651.
Applying the various rules of construction cited above, we conclude the ALC erred 
in construing the provision to permit use of the curb inlet baskets.  Section C 
(3)(XIII)(A) states the first half inch of runoff "shall" be stored.  Therefore, the 
requirement of storage is mandatory.  Richard Geer, the DHEC engineer associate 
who reviewed and approved the permit application, testified at the hearing.  With 
regard to the basket system, he stated "[i]t doesn't store.  It filters that half inch of 
runoff." 
Section C(3)(XIII)(A) further provides three options by which storage may be 
accomplished—detention, retention, and infiltration.  With respect to infiltration, it 
is defined as "the passage or movement of water through the soil profile."  S.C. 
Code Ann. Regs. 72-301(22) (2012).  Infiltration inherently provides for storage as 
stormwater does not flow directly into the receiving body, but leeches into the soil 
profile over a period of time. Geer testified, and Respondents concede, the curb 
inlet baskets are not a method of infiltration.  The use of the term "may" does not 
automatically render the requirements of this provision optional.  Applying the 
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of the three named 
alternatives—retention, detention, and infiltration—as options implies other 
methods of treating the stormwater are excluded.  Furthermore, the Best 
Management Practices cited to in the ALC's order are general, while the provision 
governing the storage of runoff in this case is specific and therefore, controlling.   
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Finally, the language "as appropriate for the site" cannot give unfettered discretion 
to permit a method of stormwater treatment that does not otherwise meet the 
established criteria. Such a construction would render the provision meaningless 
and futile. Reasonably interpreted, that language simply provides DHEC with the 
authority to consider that one of the three enumerated methods of stormwater 
management may not be appropriate for a particular site based on factors such as 
the soil profile. 
Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude the ALC misinterpreted this provision 
as permissive.  Therefore, because the method of stormwater management
approved in Cat Island POA's permit is inconsistent with this provision, the permit 
should not have been granted, and the ALC's decision affirming that approval is 
reversed. 
II. Modification of Existing Permit
Next, Appellants argue Cat Island POA had an ongoing obligation to maintain the 
stormwater treatment system approved in 2004 and in order to modify that system, 
the developer must show a condition for modification was present under the 
applicable regulations. According to Regulation 61-9.122.62(a): 
When the Department receives any information (for 
example, inspects the facility, receives information 
submitted by the permittee as required in the permit (see 
section 122.41), receives a request for modification or 
revocation and reissuance under section 124.5, or 
conducts a review of the permit file), it may determine 
whether or not one or more of the causes listed in 
paragraph (d) and (e) of this section for modification or 
revocation and reissuance or both exist. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-9.122.62(a) (2011).  One of the justifications for 
modification listed in subsection (d) of the regulation states modification may be 
allowed if there are "material and substantial alterations to the permitted facility  . . 
. which justify the application of permit conditions that are different or absent in 
the existing permit."  S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-9.122.62(d)(1) (2011).   
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Geer testified the regulations are binding on OCRM and the retrofit project.  He 
further testified the regulation appeared "to allow for the modification that was 
requested." However, he also stated he had not read through the regulation but 
opined a request for modification made under the regulation could have been 
granted due to "material and substantial alterations or additions to the permitted 
facility" quoting the language from subsection (d)(1).   
While this regulation was raised to the ALC, it was not addressed in the final order.  
Appellants raised the issue again in their motion to reconsider.  The ALC denied 
the motion and did not mention this regulation or its applicability to the case.   
We conclude Cat Island POA's Application constituted a modification and DHEC 
should have considered it as such under the applicable regulations.  We cannot 
determine from the record whether circumstances justifying a modification 
pursuant to Regulation 61-9.122.62(d) of the South Carolina Code existed.   
However, even if such circumstances were present, the curb inlet baskets still do 
not meet the requirements of the provision discussed in Section I of this opinion.  
Therefore, although we determine the modification regulations should have been 
considered, we do not decide whether this change was a permissible modification.  
III.  Waiver of Water Quantity Requirements 
Appellants contend the ALC erred in affirming DHEC's decision to waive certain 
water quantity requirements for NPDES permits pursuant to Regulation 72-
302(b)(2)(a) of the South Carolina Code (2012).  This issue relates specifically to 
DHEC's evaluation of Cat Island POA's application assuming the curb inlet baskets 
were an otherwise appropriate method of stormwater treatment.  Because we 
determined the permit should not have been granted based on its inconsistency 
with Chapter III, Section C(3)(XIII)(A) of the CMP document, Stormwater Runoff 
Storage Requirements, we decline to address this issue.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(holding an appellate court need not address an issue when the determination of 
another issue is dispositive). 
IV. Alteration of the Critical Area
Under the Coastal Tidelands Act and the CMP document, when dealing with a 
critical area, DHEC is required to consider the extent to which a project would 
impact the environment.  S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-30 (2008).  "Critical area" is 
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defined as "(1) coastal waters; (2) tidelands; (3) beaches; [or] (4) beach/dune 
system which is the area from the mean high-water mark to the setback line as 
determined in [s]ection 48-39-280."  S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10(J) (2008).   
The ALC determined the Retrofit Project does not alter the critical area and even if 
it did, it would be exempt under section 48-39-130(D)(3) of the South Carolina 
Code (2008). According to that section of the Coastal Tidelands Act, it is not 
necessary to apply for a permit if the activity is "[t]he discharge of treated effluent 
as permitted by law; provided, however, that the department shall have the 
authority to review and comment on all proposed permits that would affect critical 
areas."  § 48-39-130(D)(3). Further, the ALC found the Retrofit Project was to be 
conducted in the uplands rather than in the critical area and the alteration to the 
critical area happened in the 1960s when the dike was installed and a tidal salt 
marsh became an open water pond.
We do not need to reach this issue, as we hold the Retrofit Project was approved in 
violation of Chapter III, Section C(3)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document. 
V. Proximity to Shellfish Beds2 
Appellants contend the ALC erred in reversing the Board's decision finding 
DHEC's measurements from the stormwater flow to nearby shellfish beds 
insufficient to support DHEC's approval of the NPDES permit.  We disagree. 
Chapter III, Section C(3)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document, Stormwater Runoff 
Storage Requirements, previously discussed in Section I, goes on to address the 
proximity of stormwater runoff to shellfish beds.  It states: "In addition, for those 
projects which are located within 1,000 (one-thousand) feet of shellfish beds, the 
first one and one-half (1 ½) inches of runoff from the built-upon portion of the 
2 Because this issue is not tied directly to using curb inlet baskets to manage 
stormwater from Garfield Park, and for the sake of judicial economy, we will 
address it. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 599, 553 S.E.2d 
110, 119 (2001) (addressing an issue for the sake of judicial economy and to 
prevent further litigation between the parties). 
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property must be retained on site."3  The ALC found the shellfish beds were not 
within the one thousand-foot zone.   
To determine whether the permit would violate the 1,000 foot prohibition, DHEC 
and Cat Island POA's engineer measured the path stormwater would follow from 
the nearest outfall pipe for Garfield Park toward the shellfish bed.  This path was a 
"defined drainage pathway" in the bottom of Chowan Creek and measured at low 
tide. On appeal, the Board determined DHEC's measurements were insufficient 
because they did not take high tide into consideration and because stormwater 
moving through high tide would take a more direct path toward the shellfish bed 
rather than following the trench drainage path.  Respondents appealed that 
determination.   
At the hearing, Respondents submitted measurements that did consider high tide— 
a measurement of 1,002 feet. Appellants continued to contend their measurements 
were correct. Those measurements were made from a different outfall pipe it 
believed carried stormwater from Garfield Park and gave far less consideration to 
the defined drainage pathway.  The ALC determined Respondents' measurements 
were more credible than those taken by Appellants' surveyor and engineer.  
Appellants argue in their brief that Respondents admit their measurements were 
from the wrong starting point.  However, a closer reading of the testimony 
indicates this is a mischaracterization.  Geer answered questions posed as 
3 We conclude the issue regarding the term "located" as framed by the dissent is 
not specifically argued by Appellants on appeal, nor was it presented below.  
Therefore, we do not believe this precise issue is preserved for review.  See S.C. 
Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301-02, 641 S.E.2d 
903, 907 (2007) ("There are four basic requirements to preserving issues at trial for 
appellate review. The issue must have been (1) raised to and ruled upon by the 
trial court, (2) raised by the appellant, (3) raised in a timely manner, and (4) raised 
to the trial court with sufficient specificity." (quoting Jean Hoefer Toal et 
al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 57 (2d ed. 2002))). Furthermore, we are 
not persuaded the term located, in the context of a regulation concerning the flow 
of stormwater, would necessarily be controlled by the interpretation of that term in 
the types of cases relied upon by the dissent. 
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hypotheticals, and never indicated his measurement was from an incorrect starting 
point. 
It is somewhat concerning that Respondents' measurements are so close to the 
prohibited area. Such a case may warrant erring on the side of caution and 
protecting the shellfish beds.  However, the 1,000-foot distance is an established 
bright line, and the appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
ALC. See Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 412 S.C. 244, 249, 772 
S.E.2d 505, 508 (2015) ("An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the ALC as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.").  
Because reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the ALC, we 
conclude substantial evidence in the record supported its findings on this issue.    
See Murphy, 396 S.C. at 639, 723 S.E.2d at 94-95 (2012) ("When finding 
substantial evidence to support the ALC's decision, the court need only determine 
that, based on the record as a whole, reasonable minds could reach the same 
conclusion."). 
VI. Consistency with the CMP 
Appellants argue the Retrofit Project was not consistent to the maximum extent 
practicable with the CMP and therefore, the ALC erred in approving it.  Because 
we find the ALC erred in its reading of Chapter III, Section 3(C)(XIII)(A) of the 
CMP Document, we agree the Retrofit Project was not consistent to the maximum
extent practicable with the CMP.   
VII. Alteration of Freshwater or Brackish Wetlands 
Appellants contend the ALC erred in approving DHEC's granting the NPDES 
permit because the permit will violate the section of the CMP governing residential 
development that states, "Residential development which would require filling or 
other permanent alteration of salt, brackish or freshwater wetlands will be 
prohibited, unless no feasible alternative exist or an overriding public interest can 
be demonstrated, and any substantial environmental damage can be minimized."
Again, this issue relates specifically to DHEC's evaluation of Cat Island POA's 
NPDES permit application assuming the curb inlet baskets were an otherwise 
appropriate method of stormwater treatment.  Because we determined the permit 
should not have been granted based its inconsistency with Chapter III, Section 
3(C)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document, Stormwater Runoff Storage Requirements, 
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we decline to address this issue.  See Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 
(holding an appellate court need not address an issue when the determination of 
another issue is dispositive). 
VIII. Stormwater Treatment for Tabby Park 
Appellants argue the ALC erred in approving the permit because it eliminated the 
proper stormwater treatment for Tabby Park, an adjacent subdivision on Cat Island.  
We disagree. 
According to the ALC's order, Appellants did not produce evidence to refute 
DHEC's conclusion that none of the other developments on Cat Island relied on the 
Lake for stormwater treatment.  Further, the ALC noted Appellant's engineer, 
Christopher Moore, agreed the permitting file for Tabby Park contained no 
information showing reliance on the Lake.  Moore was asked if he saw any 
indication Tabby Park relied upon the Lake to detain water.  He answered "[f]rom 
the information that I saw or that I had access to, I did not see anything."  We agree 
with Respondents and the ALC the record contains no evidence of Tabby Park's
reliance on the lake for its stormwater treatment. Therefore, DHEC was not 
required to consider the Retrofit Project's effect on that subdivision.
IX. Repair of the Dike 
Appellants argue the ALC erred in not requiring Cat Island POA to repair the dike 
pursuant to the agreement between DHEC and Cat Island POA that was part of the 
2004 NPDES permit for Garfield Park.  We disagree. 
"[I]f a contract is made for the benefit of a third person, that person may enforce 
the contract if the contracting parties intended to create a direct, rather than an 
incidental or consequential, benefit to such third person."  Bob Hammond Constr. 
Co. v. Banks Constr. Co., 312 S.C. 422, 424, 440 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The agreement to keep the dike in repair is an underlying obligation intrinsically 
tied to the 2004 NPDES permit.  Cat Island POA is not restricted from managing 
Garfield Park's stormwater in a different way, provided that method is consistent 
with the applicable governing statutes, regulations, and provisions.  While 
Appellants are incidental beneficiaries of the method of stormwater treatment 
contemplated by the 2004 permit—living adjacent to a seven-acre lake— they lack 
standing to compel DHEC to force repair of the dike.  
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CONCLUSION 
We reverse the ALC's finding Cat Island POA's NPDES permit application was in 
compliance with Chapter III, Section 3(C)(XIII)(A) of the CMP Document.  We 
further conclude the NPDES permit application did constitute a modification of the 
2004 permit and therefore should have been evaluated under the relevant 
provisions related to modifications of permits.  Additionally, for the sake of 
judicial economy, we affirm the ALC's finding the shellfish beds of Chowan Creek 
were outside the one thousand-foot area requiring retention of stormwater on site, 
affirm the ALC's conclusion treatment of stormwater for Tabby Park via the 
detention pond was not established at trial, and affirm the ALC's ruling Appellants 
could not compel DHEC to force repair of the dike pursuant to the agreement 
between DHEC and Cat Island POA.  We decline to address the remaining issues 
raised as they relate to evaluation of the Cat Island POA's NPDES permit 
application providing for the use of curb inlet baskets.  Therefore, the ALC's order 
is   
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 
HUFF, J., concurs. 
GEATHERS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate 
opinion:  I concur with most of the majority opinion.  However, I must depart with 
the majority's analysis in section V pertaining to the project's proximity to shellfish 
beds. 
 
Initially, I disagree with the majority's statement that the question of interpreting 
the shellfish bed provision in the Stormwater Runoff Storage Requirements is 
unpreserved. In Appellants' request for a contested case hearing, they referenced, 
through incorporation of an attached exhibit, the shellfish bed provision as one of 
the grounds on which they sought a hearing.  This ground logically subsumes the 
question of the provision's interpretation, as evidenced by the ALC's discussion of 
interpretation in its order. Further, the ALC noted that Appellants submitted a 
survey reflecting "a straight line path of the stormwater flow."  Appellants 
referenced this straight-line survey as well as their rope measurements in their 
opening statement at the hearing.  Moreover, Appellants sufficiently argued in their 
appellate brief that the provision's plain language requires a direct measurement 
rather than the serpentine measurement employed by DHEC:  "Nowhere in the 
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CMP is there any description of a distance based on some alleged winding 
drainage pathway. The language simply and clearly refers to projects 'which are 
located' within 1,000 feet of shellfish beds.  The ALC erred when it failed to 
simply determine that distance without regard to some winding pathway for the 
stormwater."  
 
Accordingly, the question of the provision's interpretation is undoubtedly 
preserved for review. Even if there were some doubt as to preservation, we note 
Cat Island POA and DHEC have not asserted in their joint brief that this question 
is unpreserved. See Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 
323, 333, 730 S.E.2d 282, 287 (2012), Toal, C.J. (concurring in result in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[W]here the question of preservation is subject to multiple 
interpretations, any doubt should be resolved in favor of preservation.  When the 
opposing party does not raise a preservation issue on appeal, courts are not 
precluded from finding the issue unpreserved if the error is clear.  However, the 
silence of an adversary should serve as an indicator to the court of the obscurity of 
the purported procedural flaw.").  Therefore, I would resolve any possible doubt as 
to preservation in favor of Appellants on this important question. 
 
Additionally, I disagree with the majority's application of the substantial evidence 
rule to the ALC's findings concerning shellfish beds before addressing whether 
those findings are based on a correct reading of the law.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-
23-610(B)(d) (Supp. 2015) (allowing this court to reverse the ALC's decision if it 
is affected by an error of law).  The underlying question of law raised by 
Appellants is whether the retention requirement for projects within 1,000 feet of 
shellfish beds allows the method of measurement used by DHEC in this case.     
 
"In interpreting a statute,4 the court will give words their plain and ordinary 
meaning, and will not resort to forced construction that would limit or expand the 
statute." State v. Johnson, 396 S.C. 182, 188, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 
2011). The plain language of the CMP Document's Stormwater Runoff Storage 
Requirements states, in pertinent part, "[F]or those projects which are located 
4 Regulations are interpreted using the rules of statutory construction.  Murphy v. 
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 396 S.C. 633, 639, 723 S.E.2d 191, 195 
(2012). 
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within 1,000 (one thousand) feet of shellfish beds, the first one and one half (1 1/2) 
inches of runoff from the built-upon portion of the property must be retained on 
site." (emphasis added).  There are no words directing that the distance between 
the project and the shellfish beds be measured in any way other than a straight line.  
Cf. Rest. Row Assocs. v. Horry Cty., 335 S.C. 209, 220-21, 516 S.E.2d 442, 448 
(1999) (discussing a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of an adult 
entertainment establishment within 500 feet of a residential district and stating, 
"This Court requires distance measurements of this nature be done 'as the crow 
flies'" (citing Brown v. State, 333 S.C. 238, 240-41, 510 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1998))); 
Brown, 333 S.C. at 240-41, 510 S.E.2d at 213 (discussing a statute prohibiting 
distribution of a controlled substance within one-half mile radius of a school and 
stating, "Courts addressing the issue have uniformly held proximity is measured in 
a straight line, or 'as the crow flies'").5 
5 Compare Evans v. Thompson, 298 S.C. 160, 162-63, 378 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (discussing a statute prohibiting the issuance of a mini bottle license to 
a business located within 300 feet of a church, school or playground as measured 
by the shortest route of ordinary pedestrian or vehicular travel along the public 
thoroughfare, and stating, "The statute is explicit in requiring that the route be over 
a public thoroughfare; the route prescribed by the [Alcoholic Beverage Control] 
Commission is not over a public thoroughfare; it is therefore erroneous" (emphasis 
added)), with Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 497 
N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing a statute prohibiting the issuance 
of a permit to sell alcoholic beverage for premises if a wall of the premises is 
within 200 feet from a wall of a school or church and stating, "In interpreting the 
appropriate means of measurement, we are guided by the terms within the statute.  
A statute may specify the precise terminal points to be used in a measurement, but 
in the absence of an express provision, the general rule is that measurement should 
be along the shortest straight line connecting a church and the proposed premises, 
regardless of intervening obstacles.  [The license applicant's] initial argument, that 
the measurement should be based on a line of pedestrian travel from doorway to 
doorway, strains our reading of the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute. 
Nowhere does the statute state that the proposed premises must not be situated 
within a 'walking' distance of 200 feet from a church 'doorway'" (emphases added) 
(citations omitted)). 
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While the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration 
"will be accorded the most respectful consideration," an agency's interpretation 
"affords no basis for the perpetuation of a patently erroneous application of the 
statute." State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 351, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575-76 (2010) 
(quotation marks omitted); see also Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 34-35, 766 S.E.2d 707, 718 (2014) ("We 
defer to an agency interpretation unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.'" (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); id. at 39, 766 S.E.2d at 720-21 ("Our role is to 
apply and interpret, not rewrite, regulations.  Where the language of a regulation is 
plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, interpretation of the 
regulation is unnecessary and improper."); Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 
S.C. 434, 436, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995) (“If a statute's language is plain and 
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for 
employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or 
impose another meaning.  Where the terms of the statute are clear, the court must 
apply those terms according to their literal meaning.” (citation omitted)).   
It is undisputed that neither DHEC nor Cat Island POA measured the distance 
between the project and the shellfish beds in a straight line. Therefore, I would 
reverse the ALC's conclusion that deference should be given to DHEC's 
interpretation of the shellfish bed provision in the CMP Document's Stormwater 
Runoff Storage Requirements, and I would reverse the ALC's findings concerning 
the distance between the project and the shellfish beds because they are based on 
this error of law. 
Based on the foregoing, I concur in reversing the ALC's order upholding DHEC 
staff's Consistency Determination, but I respectfully dissent from affirming the 
ALC's findings pertaining to the distance between the project and shellfish beds.    
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